



U. S. POLICY OF ARMS AID SINCE 1973


DISSERTATION
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


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This is to certify that the dissertation entitled " U.S. Policy of Arms Aid Since 1973" is the original research work of Mr. Asim Zafar Khan, who has worked under my supervision. In my opinion, the dissertation is fit for consideration for the award of M.Phil degree of Aligarh Muslim University. The candidate has cleared M. Phil papers and has fulfilled residence and attendance requirements.


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C O N T E N T S

	<u>page</u>
INTRODUCTION	i-iii
CHAPTER I : ARMS AID AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY	1-15
CHAPTER II : U.S. ARMS AID SINCE WORLD WAR II	16-41
CHAPTER III : U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES-ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE	42-65
CHAPTER IV : U.S. ARMS AID AND SUPPLIES	66-121
CONCLUSION	122-128
BIBLIOGRAPHY	129-150

INTRODUCTION

Arms Transfers have been, since the end of World War II, a major Instrument of U.S. foreign policy. At the height of the cold War, they were relatively noncontroversial but growing global market of weapons, make the arms transfers a subject of concern for several members of Congress, government officials and some segments of public. On the one hand, President Carter tried to limit the sale of arms to the third World by adopting a series of unilateral restraints on U.S. arms exports and by initiating negotiations with the Soviet Union. President Carter believed that arms sales could contribute to regional instability and increase the risk of war. On the other hand, President Reagan viewed arms sales as necessary to prevent the Soviet Union and its allies from destabilizing the balance of power in various regions and threatening the security of America's friends and allies.

The recent change in U.S. policy has renewed the debate over arms sales and the contribution they make to U.S. interests throughout the world.

This study briefly outlines the following aspects:
Enhancement of security of United States and its friends and allies by selling arms, what diplomatic advantages accrue to the United States from its arms export ?

What are the economic benefits from selling arms to other countries ?.

Chapter one represents the U.S. arms aid and policy objectives. Chapter two is a review of U.S. arms transfer policy during the postwar period. It examines in detail the policy assumptions and objectives of the Carter and Reagan administrations. Chapter three describes the decision making process for U.S. arms sales. Chapter four outline the U.S. arms aid and supplies to the Third World and allies.

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- 111 -

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(ASIM ZAFAR KHAN)

Chapter - I

ARMS AID AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY

ARMS SALES AND U.S. SECURITY: To provide the Security of its people is the most important responsibility of a nation-state. And for accomplishing this goal, the United States used several means. As one of the means, the United States has entered into a number of collective security arrangements with other nations. Through these arrangements, it has contributed to the regional and global stability by providing a counter to Soviet aggression Worldwide. Security assistance and in particular arms sales, are an increasingly important dimensions of U.S. policy, which seeks to ensure the security of friends and allies and thereby enhance its own.

Through security assistance measures, such as arms sales, the United States enables allies to undertake regional responsibilities that it would otherwise have to assume. The sale of arms to allies is an alternative to deploying U.S. troops in the region. Proponents of arms sales cite several examples. Greece and Turkey perform duties critical to U.S. security interests by protecting the Southern flank of NATO. Turkey occupies a strategic position controlling access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea and faces the Soviet Union over the longest land border of any NATO country. With modern arms these

countries can effectively counter Soviet moves to the South Without the presense of U.S. troops.

A similar case can be made for Pakistan, given its strategic location and the ~~proximate~~ Soviet threat in Afghanistan. A strong, confident Pakistan capable of withstanding Soviet intimidation is essential to protect U.S. and free world interests in the area¹ consequently, the United States is exploring options for modernizing Pakistani forces to deter Soviet aggression in that area.

Arms sales to Taiwan are another example where the United States prompted self-sufficiency and regional stability. Self sufficiency, however, is not a justification for unrestrained arms sales. According to one observer, "the role of arms sales in supporting American security must be highly contingent, because interests outside Europe are diverse, conditional and inconsistent". Unfortunately advocates of restraint "often do not take seriously the recipient's military requirements, and see proliferation of weaponry as a counter-productive indulgence that may precipitate the United States into self destructive

1. Jane A. Coon, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, "Aid to Pakistan", statement before subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 27, 1981, Department of State Bulletin June, 1981, p.53

involvements in conflict."²

Arms sales are also recognition that nations have their own legitimate security needs that require an adequate defense against regional adversaries. Security assistance "furnishes tangible evidence of U.S. support for their independence and territorial integrity, thus deterring possible aggression."³

Although the United States has become increasingly aware of its inability to police the World alone, it continues to have a major interest in the survival of other nations. Maintaining their strengths serves U.S. military interest by promoting regional stability and reducing the potential for direct U.S. involvement. These nations should be independently capable of deterring attacks from their neighbours. The assistance provided to Thailand for example, helped bolster Thai resolve in the face of Soviet-supported Vietnamese forces positioned along its Eastern border.⁴

2. Richard K. Belts, "The Tragicomedy of Arms Trade control," International security, Vol.5, No.1, Summer 1980, p.82

3. James L. Buckley, under secretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology, "FY, 1982 security Assistance Request" Statement before the sub-committee on International security and Science affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committees, March 19, 1981, Deptt. of State Bulletin, May 1981, p.63

4. Ibid.

The Nixon doctrine established arms sales and the training of indigenous military forces as a substitute for U.S. presence. Supplying arms to friendly forces was economically less burdensome and politically less controversial than deploying American troops in other countries. Arming friends and relying upon their troops could produce larger armies at lower cost. South Korea, for example, can maintain twenty troops for the cost of one U.S. soldier; Turkey can maintain twelve.⁵

Under Reagan Administration, arms are again seen as as "integral component of our global defense posture."⁶ Sales to allies and friendly Third World nations are seen as complementing U.S. military forces. Consequently, the United States is not only rebuilding its own military strength but also giving attention to the security needs of its friends and allies "whose strength and support are major pillars of our own country".⁷

Egypt plays a pivotal role in support of U.S. interests as the major force for Arab moderation in the Middle East. Egypt has its own security needs as well. It must provide

5. Cited in David J. Louscher, "The Rise of Military Sales as a U.S. Foreign Assistance Instrument," Orbis, Vo.20 No.4, Winter 1977, p.957.

6. Buckley, "FY 1982 Security Assistance Regulation", p.63.

7. Ibid.

security for its ally Sudan, for the Nile River as an economic lifeline, for Egypt's Coast Lines, and particularly for the Suez canal. There are also external threats from Libya and other sources.⁸ Arms sales will allow Egypt to modernize its forces, increase its confidence, and match Israel's strength. By aiding Egypt's military modernization, the United States contributes to regional stability and encourages continuation of the Camp David peace process.

Opponents of arms sales argue that high arms levels are destabilizing. As president Carter put it, "The virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every region of the World".⁹ Proponents point out that this assessment is only partially correct because the existence of arms within a region does not by itself create instability. Instability results from unequal strength between adversaries. Key to regional stability are the maintenance of regional arms balances, diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions and resolve differences peacefully. High levels of arms can be stabilizing as long as a real or perceived balance is maintained. The Middle East and Persian Gulf were not "made volatile by the (arms) transfer; rather, the transfers were prompted by

8. Ibid.

the volatility".¹⁰

Proponents have often cited the access to military operating bases overseas as another benefit of arms sales. Facilities on permanent basis are needed to support forward-deployed U.S. forces. This adds credibility to security alliances and maintains a U.S. presence in various regions. Facilities in Europe are available under NATO, agreement. Arms sales to Spain have been tied to continued access by U.S. forces to bases in that area, which is of great importance to maintaining the U.S. defense posture in Europe. In the Philippines, arms assistance is regarded as quid pro quo for the use of Clark Air Bases, Subic Naval Base, and related U.S. facilities. These bases are critical to America's remaining on Asian and Pacific power and to the projection of U.S. power into the Indian Ocean.¹¹

In South West Asia, the United States is seeking military access to strategically located facilities. The United States will upgrade, in exchange, ports and airfields in Oman for its own purposes and for Oman's permanent use with a \$ 1-1.5 billion military construction program. Oman's position overlooking the strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf makes it a key factor in America's Persian Gulf posture. Arms sales to Somalia have

10. Betts, op. cit., p.87.

11. "Congressional presentation: Security Assistance Programs, FY 1982" in U.S. Congress, House Representatives, committee on Appropriations, subcommittee on Foreign operations and Related Agencies, Foreign Assistance and Relation programs Appropriations for 1982, 97th cong. 1st. Sess, 1981, part 6, p. 757.

improved the chances that American Military forces will be able to use port facilities in that country to enhance access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean and have improved the ability of the United States to counter growing Soviet Naval strength in the area.

In addition, the United States desires cooperative military arrangements with countries that can enhance the projection of its power and support joint military operations during crisis. Providing arms and support ensures that the logistic pipeline would already be in place, facilitating rapid response by U.S. military forces into an area. Thus regional security can be enhanced by mutual beneficial defense relationships that provide common equipment to U.S. allies.

ARMS SALES AND FOREIGN POLICY: Arms sales are an added element that can satisfy U.S. Foreign policy objectives. These objectives may be longlasting or recently derived from a change in regional alignment or internal political regimes. Arms sales may provide political influence, either potential or actual, or they may produce direct leverage over a recipient's behaviour in ongoing events.

The United States design influence from actions that are symbolic, such as demonstration of friendship toward Pro-U.S nations or Independent nations in its political orientation. Influence could result from an expression of ideological support for a regime that is favourable to the United States but facing domestic inability. Special

relationships that can evolve not only are mutually beneficial politically, but also can preempt the competition's attempts to gain influence. The appearance of closeness between the United States and the recipient may send appropriate signals to third parties, such as the Soviet Union.

Arms sales provide leverage to achieve specific goals. They can bring pressure on the recipient to pursue certain national policies or to alter its behaviour. Sometimes greater leverage results from the threat of withholding arms than from continuing to supply them. This is especially true where an agreement to provide arms had been previously established. It has been suggested, for example, that the United States used its control over Israeli military supplies and spares in the 1973 Middle East War to pressurize Israel to cease military action after cutting off the Egyptian Third Army.

The United States has used both Egypt and Israel to modify their positions and agree to a peace settlement. In addition, to maintaining Israeli strength, President Carter agreed to provide arms to Egypt. The sale of arms to Egypt encouraged a troubled Sadat to continue to work toward the Camp David accords.

Conventional arms sales have provided the leverage to dissuade countries like South Korea, and Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The United States threatened to cut off sales to South Korea if it bought a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. Iran was simply to retain its open-ended commitment of sales from the United States.¹²

Access to conventional weapons reduces the likelihood that a recipient would resort to nuclear weapons. Reducing the incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons by providing sophisticated conventional arms is seen as being more effective than rigid enforcement of safeguards.

The United States can offer, at reasonable prices, a wide range of sophisticated, maintainable weapons that would not only enhance the military capability of recipients but also provide flexibility not offered by nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons are needed to deter conventional conflict. Making these weapons available does not guarantee against the recipient's developing nuclear capabilities. To deny conventional systems necessary to maintain regional balances and national security, however, could create the wrong incentive. Deprived of U.S. equipment, the insecure nation might take the

12. Leslie H. Gelb, "Arms Sales", Foreign Policy No.25, Winter 1976-1977, P.12.

necessary steps to produce nuclear weapons.¹³

ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS SALES: Arms sales earn foreign exchange and improve the U.S. balance of payments. In 1960's the United States sold arms to European allies to offset the costs of American troops committed to NATO. In 1970's the United States vigorously pursued arms sales to Persian Gulf countries to recoup dollars spent on oil. Today, the world arms market is even more lucrative, as significant foreign exchange earnings accrue to the United States.

Arms sales made up 3.1 percent of total U.S. exports in 1979 (0.2 percent of a \$ 2.4 trillion GNP). Though often dismissed as having little relative value with respect to total economic activity, arms transfers in absolute terms (\$ 5.6 billion in 1979) are significant.¹⁴

Arms sales can be used to ensure access to critical raw materials, such as Middle East Oil. Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region would be reluctant to interrupt the sale of oil to the United States given their reliance on American arms, military and civil construction,

13. See, Richard Burt, "Nuclear Proliferation and the spread of New Conventional Weapons Technology", In Newman and Harkary, Arms Transfers in the Modern World, PP.80-108.

14. U.S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979, P.123.

spare parts, technical services, and training. The relationship explains in part why almost one-half of United States's sales go to the Middle East. This is in contrast to the situation in 1973, when United States had little arms leverage to exercise. During the oil embargo, the Shah of Iran supplied both the United States and Israel with oil (to the displeasure of his Arab OPEC partners) in part because of his special arms relationship with the United States.

A number of studies have shown that arms sales increase employment. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), for example, analyzed the macroeconomics effects of sales, using 1976 FMS of \$ 8.2 billion as the base line. (FMS as identified at that time constituted over 90 percent of U.S. arms sales). Assuming a complete ban on sales of 1977, by 1981 there would have been 350,000 fewer jobs in private industry than if FMS had continued at the constant 1976 rate.¹⁵ A study by the Labor statistics in 1977 estimated that foreign military sales in 1977 provided 277,000 jobs.¹⁶ Industry officials estimate that for every \$ 1 billion of arms sales, more than 30,000 jobs are created directly and 60,000 more are created in related

15. Congressional Budget Office, The Effect of Foreign Military Sales on the U.S. Economy, (Washington, D.C.: CBO, Staff Working Paper, July 23, 1976), P.1.

16. Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1982, P.26.

activities.¹⁷

Another benefit of arms sales results from cost savings from economics in expanding production. These savings are passed on to buyers in the form of a lower unit cost of each item produced. These lower unit costs may permit the United States to buy needed weapons in numbers that were previously unaffordable.

Arms sales generate overhead savings. That is, certain fixed costs, which do not vary with the volume of sales, are passed on to the buyer.

Research and Development (R&D) expenses are an easily identifiable saving from foreign sales. They are typically incurred early in the systems acquisition process and would be borne totally by the United States in the absence of sales abroad. The U.S. government can recoup a portion of these expenses by attaching a prorated surcharge to the price of these weapons and overseas. Although other savings are more difficult to measure, they nonetheless contribute to covering systems unit cost.

Foreign sales may generate savings by absorbing a portion of the cost of expending or accelerating a particular production run that would otherwise have been

17. "Arms Sales Policy", in U.S. Defense Policy: Weapon Strategy and Commitments, (Washington, D.C. Congressional 1980), p.94.

required to satisfy U.S. inventory requirements implicitly, a greater than equal share of the nonrecurring cost of new tooling it passed on to the foreign buyer.¹⁸

Standardization of equipment among friends and allies, a particularly timely issue for NATO countries, can be a benefit of arms sales. From the European perspective standardization has generally meant the purchase of U.S. military goods. Despite efforts to reverse the trend, the U.S. share of sales in 1976 to a 9.4 to 1 ratio in 1980.¹⁹

One can also argue that if the United States does not sell arms, then another country will do so and will reap the economic rewards.

U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS AND STRATEGIC ACCESS: The previous postwar and current development of the relationship between U.S. basing facilities and arms transfers has of course, been distinct from the Soviet experience. In the immediate wake of World War II and at the onset of the cold war, the United States and its allies were provided an expansive global basing system by colonial remnants, through alliances and economic and military aid relationship, and generally, as a consequent of the force deployments emerging from World War II.

18. C.B.O., Budgetary Savings to the Department of Defense Resulting from Foreign Military Sales, Washington, D.C.; C.B.O., Staff Working Paper, May 24, 1976, pp.3-5.

19. "Senators Propose Agency to Select NATO's Arms", Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 10, 1982, p.21.

The United States is, of course, availed of numerous facilities in Western Europe through its NATO alliance. Some of these, however, as indicated during the 1973 war, may not be available for purposes not directly connected with NATO, that is, anti-Soviet defense. The Turkish-Greek imbroglio over Cyprus has also indicated the precariousness of some U.S. base facilities, certainly to the extent that their continued use depends heavily on a continuity flow of arms supplies to the host countries. By and larger however, the continuing U.S. security relationship with Western Europe (of which arms transfers is one aspect) does assure some solid strategic assets which are usable for a wide range of purposes and contingencies.

The United States is also still able to make use of some facilities in areas outside Europe controlled by its closest NATO allies, hence routinely available for most purposes. Most notable here are Greenland (owned by Denmark), the Netherland Antilles, and British possessions including Ascension Island, the Phoenix Islands, and the Islands of Turks, Caicos, and St. Lucia in the Caribbean. Ascension is potentially valuable as a staging point and as a base for surveillance activities with respect to contingencies in Southern Africa or in the South Atlantic.

Around the Indian Ocean, U.S. arms transfers have been used to maintain scattered enclaves of strategic access to match the expanding Soviet basing network, most notably in Oman, Kenya, and Singapore.

The growing U.S. supply relationship with Kenya, including the transfer of F-5E fighter aircraft, has allowed for continued U.S. naval visits to Mombasa and for possible use of Kenyan airfields for staging P-3 Orion Surveillance flights over the Indian Ocean.²⁰

In South Asia and in the Pacific the United States maintains a ring of bases around the Asian mainland, and most are backed up by continuing arms-supply relationships. The recipients include Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Singapore does not provide major facilities but allow regular transit of military air transport and P-3 flights, as well as naval maintenance facilities.²¹ The major bases are at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay in the Philippines, Okinawa, various air bases in Korea and Japan, and now in Western Australia, all supported by broader military relationship (including arms sales), as well as essential ideological affinity.

20. "Kenya Offers New Flexibility to U.S. Indian Ocean P-3 Patrols," Baltimore Sun, July 30, 1976, reprinted in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 102 (1976).

21. Neuman and Harkavy, Op. cit.

Chapter- II

U.S. ARMS AID SINCE WORLD WAR II

Arms transfers to other countries have been a major and continuing instrument of U.S. foreign policy, since World War II. Arms exports have traditionally taken two forms: grant aid and weapons sales for credit or cash. From World War II until the mid 1960s arms transfers were a controversial component of U.S. national Security policy. It was generally accepted that weapons exports not only were helpful to recipient countries but contributed to U.S. Security as well providing weapons to allies and friends was justified by the perceived Soviet threat and constituted a key element of U.S. containment policy.

The situation began to change, however, in the late 1960s. Although arms transfers continued to play a prominent role in U.S. foreign policy, increasing reliance on weapons exports by successive administrations began to cause concern among members of congress and segments of U.S. public. Not only was the volume of arms transfers rising steadily, but the weapons sold abroad were becoming more sophisticated. Whereas arms transfers had previously been directed almost exclusively toward European allies and other close friends of the United States, predominantly in the form of military assistance grants, more and more transfers in 1970s

were made to third world countries through government.
to government sales.

By the mid -1970s Congress had began to exercise greater control over U.S. arms transfers, although the primary responsibility for setting arms export policy still resided with the president. The carter policy sought to limit unilaterally U.S. arms sales to the Third World and to negotiates multilateral restraints with other major arms suppliers. The Reagan administration, however, has abandoned a majority of the objectives of the carter policy. It has instead emphasized what it sees as a global threat posed by the Soviet Union, a threat that requires the United States to supply arms to its friends and allies to ensure mutual security.

Background: The United States ranked third in arms exports, before World War II, behind France and Great Britain.¹ However, with the start of second World War, Arms transfers became a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The first step taken towards this was the revision of the Neutrality Act, in 1939, which lifted the leagal prohibition against the sale of arms to belligerents and permitted the "Cash and Carry

1. Geoffery Kemp, With Steven Miller, "The Arms Transfers Phenomenon," in Andrew J. Pierre, ed., Arms Transfers and American Foreign Policy, New York: New York University Press, 1979, P.21.

concept to prevail during War time.²

U.S. government found additional ways to aid the Allies despite America's "neutral" status, after revision of Neutrality Act. It expanded its role as a supplier of arms and defence service as the war escalated in Europe. President Roosevelt's Great destroyers - for - bases deal with Great Britain after the German invasion of France in 1940. In March 1941, Congress passed the lend-leases programme, establishing the United States as the arms supplier for the allies forces. Under lend-lease, arms worth tens of billions of dollars were transferred to the Allies between 1941 and 1945.³

Also during World War I, United States had been a major arms supplier, but the volume of transfers had become slackened during the inter war period. However, arms transfers programmes, after World War II, continued under the U.S. Strategy of containing communist expansion. The Truman Doctrine, enunciated in 1947, was designed to provide United States Assistance to countries threatened by the Soviet Unions; The policy was initially a response to communist guerrilla activity in Greece and Soviet pressure

2. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), The Management of security Assistance, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 1981, P.P.1-22.

3. Ibid.

on Turkey to gain joint control over the Dardanelles. The enactment of public law 75, providing military aid to Greece and Turkey, marked the beginning of military assistance programmes.⁴

More weapons were exported to United States's European allies with the formation of NATO in 1949. In the same year Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which formalized and expanded military aid commitments to the Philippines, Greece and Turkey, and the Republic of China.⁵ The act was passed to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the newly formed NATO alliance and was designed to cover U.S. military assistance to NATO allies and other friends of United States.

The majority of U.S. arms transfers were made, "free of charge under the name of Military Assistance Programme (MAP), mainly to NATO allies and other countries seen as threatened by communism. In the immediate postwar years, \$ 32 billion military aid were made out of which \$ 4.5 billion, \$2.2 billion, \$2.3 billion, \$ 1.5 billion and \$ 1.1 billion received by France, Turkey, Italy, Greece

4. Ibid., pp.1-25.

5. William H. Lewis, "Political influence: The Diminished capacity," in Stephen G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., Arms Transfers in the Modern World, New York: Praeger, 1979, P.188.

and the United Kingdom respectively. The Belgium and Nether lands received about \$ 1 billion each.⁶

In U.S. foreign policy, the use of arms transfers became an instrument in response to perceived threats to the United States, and its Western European allies. What emerged according to one observer, was "a military strategy of deterrence; its foreign policy counter part was containment and military assistance was to be the motor of the NATO alliance".⁷

The Policy of military assistance also expended to other geographical regions, in the 1950s and early 60s with the expansion of the policy of containment (of communism). Events in the middle East and Far East were causing a reassessment of U.S. arms transfers policy. Egypt's turn, in the mid 1950s, to the Soviet bloc for arms, The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, and increasing U.S. involvement in the Indochina toward the end of the decade resulted in a shift in the direction of weapons exports. U.S. Foreign aid policy was broadened from support only for its allies to support for other nations as well. Thus from 1950 to 1965 the primary recipients of U.S. arms exports were

6. Debating the direction of U.S. Foreign Policy: 1979-1980. High School Debat Analysis, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979, p.30.

7. Lewis, "Political influence", p.189.

France, West Germany, Italy, Turkey, Taiwan, and South Korea.⁸

The Shift in arms transfers from traditional allies of the United States to Third World Countries in South east Asia and the Middle East continues through out the 1960s. In the mid- 1960s a change was made in the form of U.S. arms exports. The U.S. security assistance changed from MAP grants to arms sales under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programmes.

In the Fiscal year 1961, military aid was twice as large as sales while by the 1966, the Sales figures were double those for military aid (excluding South Vietnam).⁹

In response to the unsuccessful U.S. military involment in Vietnam, President Nixon, in 1969, established new guidelines for U.S. security assistance policy. The Nixon doctrine declared that the United States would respect its treaty commitments and continue to help its friends and allies through military and economic assistance, but it would "look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibilities of providing the manpower for its

8. Paul C. Warnke, With Edward C. Luck, "American Transfer: Policy and process in the Executive Branch", in Andrew J. Pierre, ed., Arms Transfers and American Foreign Policy, New York: New York University, 1979, p.195.

9. Ibid., p.197.

defense."¹⁰

The use of grant military aid continued to decline in 1970s. The number of countries receiving U.S. military assistance declined from 58 in FY 1966 to 46 in FY 1975. Meanwhile, the number of arms sales recipients increased. In FY 1966, 59 nations recieved FMS deliveries; by FY 1975 the number was 74. Commercial deliveries also increased, from 51 countries receiving arms from U.S. companies in FY 1966 to 77 in FY (Fiscal Year) 1974.¹¹

Some members of Congress, in the latter half of the 1960s, began to question U.S. arms transfers policy. With enactment in 1968 of the foreign Military Sales Act, Congress required administrations to emphasize foreign policy considerations in their arms Sales Policies. The act prohibited arms Sales to governments that engage in human rights violations or impede social progress.¹² The increasing sophistication of weapons sold by United States and the value of arms transactions was rising dramatically. Those factors remained

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10. Congressional Research Service, changing perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfers Policy, Report to the Sub committee on International security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representative September 25, 1981, p.5.
 11. As cited in Warnke, "American Arms Transfers policy and process in the executive branch," pp.198-99.
 12. Congressional Research Service, changing perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, p.4.

a source of concerns among members of congress and the public in the 1970s.

Many analysts thought that arms sales agreements in the Nixon and Ford Administration were made haphazardly and without due consideration for long-term strategic interests. The Arms control and Disarmament Agency was regularly excluded from any participation in decision making process, inspite of its having statutory responsibilities.¹³ President Nixon in 1972 instructed the bureaucracy to honour virtually all requests from the government of Iran for conventional arms, thereby circumventing the formal review process. Similarly President Ford decided during 1976 Presidential campaign to sell Israel military equipments that had previously been banned.¹⁴

13. This is discussed in some detailed in Du ucer L. clarke. The politics of Arms control; The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms control and Disarmament Agency, New York: Free Press, 1979, PP.89-94.

14. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. military Sales to Iran, Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, 94th Congress, 2nd Sess; July 1976, p.41; and Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press 1982, p.48.

In response, congress passed in 1974 the Nelson Amendment to the military assistance bill. The amendment required the President to report military sales of \$ 25 million or more and gave congress 20 days to Veto them by passing a ⁿcocurrent resolution of disapproval.¹⁵ Although Congress had been exercising authority over govt. aid but untill then it had none over govt. approved sales. With passage of the Nelson Amendment, it secured veto power over major arms sales as well.

The international security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act was the most significant Piece of Legislation dealing with arms transfers since the enactment of the Mutual Security Act. This measure was designed to shift the emphasis from selling arms to controlling the sales of arms and it include specific congressional guidelines for U.S. arms sales policy.

The Act emphasized public disclosure and review procedures. With the Arms Export Control Act, Congress retained the right to veto proposed Arms Sales and the period of time was extended from 20 days to thirty days during which proposed sale could be vetoed. Congress took many additional steps to control arms traffic.¹⁶ A ceiling

15. Richard Whittle, "controls on Arms Sales lifted After Failure of Carter Policy to Reduce Flow of Weapons," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 10, 1982, p. 798.

16. Congressional Research Service, changing perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, pp. 6-9.

was placed on commercial Arms Sales; Sales to non NATO countries in excess of \$ 25 million were required to occur on a government to government basis. President was required to submit to members of congress quarterly information on arms transfers. U.S. military assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs) in foreign countries were restricted; MAAGs were reduced in size and scope of action with regard to transfers of military equipment; and security assistance was withheld from countries whose governments engage in human rights violations.

The Carter Administration:

The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 represented an affirmation of the congressional initiatives to limit the sale of U.S. Arms overseas. On May 19, 1979, President Carter announced his arms Sales Policy, stating that conventional arms transfers would be viewed as an "exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests". The carter policy established controls on transfers to all nations except member countries of NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The controls were binding "unless extraordinary circumstances necessitate a presidential exception, or where I determine that countries friendly to

the United States must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional balance".¹⁷

Carter's basic guidelines, as expressed in his statement of May 1977, were as follows.¹⁸

* The United States would not introduce newly developed advanced weapons system into a region untill they were operationally deployed with U.S. forces.

* The United States would not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed, advanced weapons systems that would create a new or significantly higher combat capability. This was intended to discourage regional arms competition based on the acquisition of higher levels of weapons technology.

* The United States would reduce the dollar volume of new commitments. For FY 1978, a ceiling was set at \$ 8.4 billion, an 8 percent decrease from fiscal year 1977 in new commitments to nonexempt nations. Excluded from the ceiling were non-weapons related service such as military construction and U.S. commercial arms transfers.

17. "President Carter Announces Policy on Transfer of Conventional Arms", Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1977, P.625.

18. Ibid.

* Human rights within recipient countries would be a consideration in future security assistance programme, and the economic impact of arms transfers to countries receiving U.S. economic assistance was also ^{to} be taken into account.

* The United State would not permit development or significant modification of advanced weapons system solely for export.

* The United States would not permit co-production agreements for significant weapons, equipment and major components ~~with~~ third countries.

* The United State would not permit the transfer of U.S. weapons to third countries. This stipulation was laid down to avoid "unnecessary bilateral friction cause by later denials".

* The "burden of persuasion" for a sale rested on proponents, not opponents, of an arms sale.

* An attempt would be made to remove the economic incentives for arms sales, such as lower per unit costs for Defense Department procurement of similar items.

* U.S. Government employees were forbidden to help arms salesmen abroad without express authorization from Washington.

* An attempt would be made to reduce International arms traffic through multilateral negotiations.

Carter guidelines did provide criteria to judge requests for arms but in practice arms sales were not an "exceptional" implement of foreign policy, nor did the dollar ceiling resulted in reduced arm sales.¹⁹

One of the ~~essential~~ components of the carter administration's arms trasfer policy was its initiatives for multilater^al restraint among the major arm suppliers. Administration officials were sent to major cooperation in reducing arms transfers, including European agreement not to take advantage of U.S. unilateral restraint by selling the arms the United State might refuse to sell.

In March 1977, the Secretary of State, Cy^u Vance, discussed conventional arms transfers during the first visit to Mascow.

The United States and Soviet Union agreed to set up a bilateral working group to address this subject. In December 1977 in Washington, First session of the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks was held.

19. Pierre, The Global politics of Arms Sales, pp.57-58. Seventeen exceptions were made to the guidelines by the Carter administration. See congressional Research Service, changing prospectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, pp.25-26.

The U.S.'s delegation explained the Carter Administration's policy on arms transfers and outlined the idea of multi-lateral restraint. The Soviet viewed the Session as exploratory and sought clarification of the Carter policy.²⁰

Five months later, in May 1978 in Helsinki, the second round of talks was held. The Soviet delegation agreed at this session that arms transfers were a serious problem that required further discussion. They also presented draft political-legal criteria for defining permissible and non permissible arms transfers. The United State suggested military and technical guidelines for weapons exports similar to the unilateral guidelines that the administration had adopted.²¹ United States, in this session of negotiations linked CAT talks to the 1972 agreement of Basic Principles of Relation between the United States and the Soviet Union and the Agreement of 1973 on the prevention of Nuclear war. These agreement had "sought to spell out rules necessary to sustain and promote Cooperative Relations between the two Super powers and to avoid situations that might lead to nuclear War".²² At the end of second session a joint

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20. Ibid., p.287

21. Ibid.

22. Barry M. Blechman, Janne E. Nolan, and Alan plate, "pushing Arms", Foreign policy, no.46, spring 1982, p.142.

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Comunique were issued which stated that "these meetings, being a component of Soviet - American negotiations on cessation of the arms race, are held in accordance with the Basic principle of Relations."²³

By the end of Second session it was evident that substantial progress was possible, so a third round of talk was scheduled two month later. But there were differences within the government over U.S. approach to the negotiation. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) gave emphasize on technical issues and wanted to minimise political Aspects of talks. ACDA wanted to established a list of weapons where transfer could be limited or prohibited, in place of dealing with foreign policy aspects of arms transfers. ACDA wanted that "the objectives of the talks would be to limit specific weapons World wide, taking into account the differences between various regions, rather than to limit all weapons transfers to individual regions with exception for specific weapons".²⁴

But the State Department officials viewed foreign policy aspects of CAT talks ^{as} more important than the technical issue of arms transfers restraint. They also felt that if

23. Ibid., p.143.

24. Ibid., p.145.

the talks were to have concrete results, it will be desirable to discuss transfers to specific regions ~~rather than~~ on controlling transfers of specific weapons system world wide.²⁵ U.S. official hoped that one outcome of the negotiations would be a better mutual understanding of Soviet and American objectives in the Third World as a basis for regulating their activities in that part of the world.

During the Third Session of CAT talks, president Carter followed the political approach, advocated by the State Department. In this session the U.S. delegation pressed the case for discussing arms transfers to specific regions of tension and also ~~attempted~~ to set military guidelines for weapons exports. The USSR emphasized the need to establish legal principles governing arms transfers. Both the countries, finally, agreed to establish^x legal principles and technical guidelines. The Soviet Union also agreed to discuss arms transfer restraints for particular regions. By the end of third meeting a 3rd part frame work was agreed upon for arm transfer restraint.

Included in this frame work were political legal criteria by which to judge potential recipients, military-technical criteria limiting the export of certain weapons

25. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sale, p.287.

systems, and plans for implementing these guidelines in specific regions.²⁶

In preparing for the fourth round of negotiations, in Mexico city, scheduled in December 1978, the Department of state proposed through diplomatic channels that the discussion begin with two regions: Latin America and Sub-saharan Africa. Soviet Union accepted these proposals and suggested that west Asia and East Asia also be discussed. This presented a problem for American policy makers, because West Asia includes Iran and East Asia includes South Korea and China. Some American officials said that discussing arms transfer restraint in West Asia might further undermine the already unstable political situation in Iran. American officials also wanted to make U.S. arms sales to South Korea a subject for negotiations with the Soviet Union. Some officials were concerned that such discussion could interfere with the negotiation then underway to normalize relations with Peking. President Carter, therefore, instructed U.S. delegation to limit bargaining with the Soviets to Latin America and Sub-saharan Africa and to walk out of the negotiations if other regions were included.

26. Barry M. Blechman, Janne E. Nolan, and Alan Platt, "pushing Arms" Foreign policy no.46, Spring 1982, p.147.

But the fourth session did not end in agreement, only legal and technical criteria were discussed. The CAT negotiations were over without considering regional issues.

The conventional arms transfers talks fell short of their objective of limiting the arms sales of the other major supplier nations. Reasons for the failure of the CAT talks were the general deterioration of Soviet - American relations at the time. Unilateral restraint that the United States was applying to its arms transfers. The Soviets, for all intents and purposes, were negotiating in a "cost free environment".²⁷ Dissension within the Carter administration and the resulting indecision on how to approach the question of multilateral restraints on arms transfers also contributed to the failure of CAT. The U.S. strategy seemed to fluctuate between the foreign policy approach advocated by the state department and the technical arms control approach preferred by ACDA. Once the president decided in favour of other diplomatic and strategic interests; such as stability in Iran and normalization of relations with China, the flexibility of the American negotiating strategy was severely limited.

27. Michael D. Saloman, David J. Louscher, and Paul Y Hammond, "Lessons of the Carter Approach to Restraining Arms Transfers, "Survival", September/October, 1981, p.203.

Several officials of the former Carter administration have provided the following reasons for failure of CAT talks: "In 1978 Carter made two contradictory decisions: first; that CAT should be a political rather than a technical negotiation : second, that the International political relations upon which it would impinge were too sensitive to discuss with the Soviet Union. This contradiction, above, all, assured the failure of CAT".²⁸

Carter Policy of unilateral restraint met with mixed success. His guidelines did provide criteria to Judge requests for arms, but in practice arms sales were not an "exceptional" implement of foreign policy, nor did the dollar ceiling, which was designed to impose quantitative control, result in arms sales.²⁹ Three major lacuna in dollar ceiling, first the ceiling did not apply to military "services" which is an essential part of U.S. foreign military sales; second commercial arms export were left out, of ceiling entirely; Third, Arms Sales to treaty allies were excluded from the ceiling.³⁰ According to some critics dollar ceiling was least successful aspect of carter's Programme, which stimulated more discussion and less comprehension than any other part of the policy.³¹

28. Blackman, Nolan, and platt "Pushing Arms", p.148.

29. ~~Pierre~~, op.cit., pp 57-60.

30. Ibid.

Inspite of short comings, the Carter policy, as implemented, made the internal decision - making process on arms sales more rigorous and systematic.³²

Reagan Administration:

Contrary to president Carter's bid to control U.S. arms sales abroad, the Reagan administration uses arms sales as key foreign policy instrument. president Reagan's first official statement on the matter, on July 8, 1981 underlined the need for flexibility in arms sales and focused on the use of arms sales to counter the Soviet global challenge.

According to the directive issued by President Reagan, the United States must "not only strengthen its own military capabilities, but be prepared to help its friends and allies to strengthen theirs through the transfer of conventional arms and other forms of Security assistance". The Reagan administration views arms transfers as an "essential element of its global defense posture and an indispensable component of its foreign policy".³³

32. Pierre, op.cit., pp.59-62.

33. "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy", Department of State Bulletin, September 1981, p.61.

The policy of Reagan administration does not have rigid guidelines. Request for U.S. arms will be evaluated "case by case" with "high priority" will be given to major alliances partner and to those countries with which the United States has cooperative Security relationship.³⁴

The goals of arms transfers in the Reagan administration are;

- * to help to enhance defense production capabilities and efficiency of United States.
- * to demonstrate the enduring interest that the United States has in its friends and allies "and that it will not allow them to be at a military disadvantage"
- * to help deter aggression by enhancing preparedness of friends and allies.
- * to "foster regional and internal stability, Thus encouraging peaceful resolution of disputes and evolutionary change."
- * to support efforts that "foster the ability of our forces to deply and operate with those of our friends and allies", thereby strenthening our mutual security relationships.

34. Pierre, op.cit.

to increase military effectiveness by improving United States's ability in conjunction with its friends and allies" to project power in response to threat posed by mutual adversaries".

The Reagan directives began by stating that the United States must pursue a "Sober, responsible, and balanced arms transfer policy, a policy that will advance united states national security assistance and those of its friends and allies. The United States not only depends the interest of "free world" but also must be ready to strengthen its friends and allies by the transfer of conventional arms and other form of security assistance."³⁵

With respect to opportunities for restraint among major arms supplier, the Reagan administration, made the observation that these had been "little or no interest in arms transfer limitations manifested by the Soviet Union or the majority of other arms producing nations." In the absence of such interest, "The United State will not Jeopardize its own security needs through a programme of unilateral restraint."³⁶ In order to increase flexibility in the selling of arms, several important step were taken in Reagan administration.

35. Pierre, op.cit. p.63

36. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, The white House, July 9, 1981.

The approvals for the sale of arms were now coming through a day where as it was a very cumbersome and time consuming process during Carter administration.³⁷

The flexibility was desirable to achieve and enhance particular foreign policy goals. And because of that only the "Clark Amendment"- which prohibits military assistance to the anti merist factions in Angola - and the "Symington Amendment" - which prohibits military assistance to the countries that do not refrain from developing nuclear weapons, were repealed and ultimately passed by the Congress.

The basic difference lies in the perception of U.S. interests and the relationship that arms transfers have to their interests. President Reagan, as apposed to President Carter's view, did not see arms sales as a cause of political instability and thought it as a means to maintain peace within their country as well as regional stability.. The Reagan Administrations understanding was that the Soviet Union is the largest supplier of the arms to the Third World and therefore, the U.S. arms sales are necessary to counter the Soviet threat, it also considers a "vital, viable, imaginative (arms) industry as an integral part of U.S. defence and foreign policy"³⁸

37. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 29 1981, p.29.

38. As cited in Whittle, "Controls on Arms Sales", p.802.

There are more specific differences between the Carter and Reagan arms sales policies. An important one focus on the use of arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy. The Carter policy stated that arms transfers were to be an "exceptional implement of foreign policy," but the Reagan administration views weapons transfers as "an essential element of its global defense posture and indispensable component of its foreign policy".

The two administrative also differed on co-production agreements. The Carter policy prohibited co-operation agreements for "significant weapons, equipment, and major components" with exceptions confined to a "limited class of items". The Ragon policy states that request for co-production agreement will be given "special scrutiny", but does not prohibit them.

With, regard to the issue of human rights, The Reagan Administration has discouraged it arms sales policy in contrast to Carter's efforts "to promote and advance" respects for human rights in recipient countries."

The Carter policy also included a number of qualitative restrictions on U.S. arms transfers. President Carter Prohibited" the development of significant modification of advanced weapons systems solely for export"; the Reagan policy have no such prohibitions. Carter, however, did

eventually allow the development of the FX fighter specially for export). Unlike Carter policy, the Reagan directives does not prohibited the sale or coproduction of newly developed advanced weapons systems untill they were "operationally deployed with the U.S. forces". Another dis-similarity is that the Reagan directive does not bar the United States from being the first to introduce new or more advanced weapons into a region.

The carter administration attempted to reduce commerical arms sales by discouraging American officials abroad from assiting U.S. arms sales-men. In a directive popularly named "The Leprosy letter", U.S. government official were baned from helping U.S. arms manufactures abroad without express authorization from Washington. The Reagan administration has taken the opposite view: U.S. officials overseas were instructed to extend the same courtesies to American firms selling arms as to other business representatives.

President Carter also attempted to remove the economic incentives for arms sales, such as lower per unit costs for Defence Department procurement of similar items. The Reagan policy states that arms sales can "help to enhance United States defense production capabilities and effeciency".

Finally, with regard to the issue of multilateral arms sales restraint. The Carter administration made an effort to achieve multilateral restraint among other major arms suppliers. The Carter administration also made unilateral restraint to set an example for other arms suppliers as it tried to initiate multilateral negotiations on the subject. Attempts at multilateral negotiations with United States's NATO allies gave way to unsuccessful bilateral talks with the Soviet Union. In contrast to Carter administration, The Reagan administration is willing to listen to the proposals of others, but says it is unwilling to Jeopardize U.S. interests through a policy of Unilateral restraint.

CHAPTER-III

U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES-ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

Decision to sell or otherwise transfer weapons or technologies are most often based on mutual security interests, and may also be designed to effect the world or regional geo-political balance, tipping it in favour of the United States, carried a step further, the transfer of weapons or technologies may be viewed as a "penetration mechanism" that advances American foreign policy interests by tying the recipient state to the United States for spare parts, training programmes, and even long term loans. In addition strategic exports and arms sales strengthen the national economy by increasing domestic production, earning foreign exchange and reducing the unit cost of weapons systems to the United States and its security assistance recipients through economics of scale.¹ Indeed, the Congress has changed the federal government with 'placing a high priority on export which would strengthen the economy.'²

The United States uses strategic exports and arms sales as levers to advance the national interest by coupling export decisions to security assistance and foreign military sales

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1. Larry M. Wortzel, "U.S. Technology Transfer Policies and the Modernization of China's Armed Forces", Asian Survey Vol. XXXVII, No.6, June 1987.
 2. Export Administration Act of 1979, Section 2(3) Renewed and amended by Public Law 99-64, July 12, 1985, the Export Administration Act of 1985.

programs to developing and cementing relations with other countries.

Another goal of U.S. policies government the transfer of weapons, technology, and strategic commodities is to improve ties with its allies, primarily in North Atlantic Treaty organization, but also in such places as South Korea, by facilitating "rationalization, standardization, and inter operability (RSI)", of equipment and procedures.³

U.S. arms sales have been the subject of congressional legislation beginning with Mutual Security Act of 1954. Congress established a variety of restrictions and conditions for grant aid, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and other security assistance programme by passing the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961. FMS rules were later incorporated into the Foreign Military Act of 1968. Till 1976, Commercial Sales of Military equipment remained under the purview of the Mutual Security Act. In 1976, commercial sales of military equipment along with FMS, were made subject to the International Security Assistance and Arms export control Act (AECA). Military grant aid

3. On RSI See Richard D. Delauer, "Armaments Co-operation with our Allies", *Singal* (October 1984): 45, 47-8. Also see Jan Feldman, "collaborative production of Defense equipment with NATO, "The Journal of strategic studies" (Sep 1984), PP. 282-300.

and other security assistance programs continue to be regulated by the Foreign Assistance Act. The Arms Export Control Act has been amended annually since 1977.

Under the Export Administration Act of 1979, now replaced by the export Administration Act of 1985 (EAA) (Public Law 64-99, July 12, 1985), the president has the authority to use export control for foreign policy or national security purposes after considering the impact of these controls on the economy, and only to the extent necessary to ensure that an export makes no significant contribution to other countries that would prove detrimental to the national security. The Department of Commerce exercises control over strategic commodities and technologies, but must consult with the Department of Defense (DOD). Suspected violations of the EAA are investigated by the office of Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce, and the U.S. customs service, which have statutory enforcement authority. Commodities and technologies covered by the provisions of the EAA are generally referred to as "dual use technologies" - those that are primarily intended for civil use, but have military application.

The Secretaries of commerce and Defense maintain a list of EAA-covered goods and technologies with military application, which is called the commodity control list

(CCL). The intent of the CCL is to ensure that no commodities are exported that might contribute to a country's military capabilities in a manner that is harmful to U.S. national security.⁴ A parallel list of munitions (called the U.S. Munition list), the export of which is also controlled, is maintained by the Department of Defense and State.

Both the Munitions list and CCL correspond with secret list developed in consultation with U.S. allies and are derived from a DOD list of critical technologies that would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any country or combination of countries and that may prove detrimental to the security of the United States.⁵ The basic list is called the "DOD Military critical list", and is often referred to as the "MCTL".

The Arms Export Controlled Act (AECA) regulates the export of defense articles and services from the United States. The Act requires that persons (including corporation) engaged in the export or import of defense articles and services register with the State Department; and that such

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4. Caspar W. Weinberger, The Technology Transfer Controlled Programme: A Report to the 98th Congress, Second Session, U.S. Department of Defense (February 1984), pp.5-11.
 5. D.D. Directive 2042.2, "International Transfers of Technology, Goods, Services, and Munitions", January 17, 1984, Enclosure 3, .83-1.

exports be licensed by that department in consultation with the DOD.⁶ The AECA supersedes the authority of the President.

The Munitions lists designates defense articles and services controlled under the AECA. The code of Federal Regulations enumerates the articles subject the restriction.

U.S. Arms exports take several forms, the major ones being grant aid and sales for cash or credits. The military assistance program (MAP), which provides grant aid to other nations under the foreign assistance Act, was the primary vehicle for U.S. arms transfers in the 1950's and early 1960's. Arms sales have subsequently replaced grants as the primary arms transfer mechanism.

By 1981, there were only four MAP recipient countries i.e. Spain, Portugal, Philippines, and Sudan. The Reagan administration in its fiscal year 1982 Congressional presentation Document proposed that no new MAP material programs be initiated unless there were exceptional circumstances.⁷ To remain eligible for grant assistance, MAP recipient have to agree with certain conditions. No assistance will be provided to a country that seizes,

6. The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S. Code 2751 et Seq. See 27778 (a) through (c).

7. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) the Management of Security Assistance (Wright-patterson AFB, Ohio; Defense Institute of Security assistance Management, 1981, P.24-


nationalizes, or expropriates U.S. property; no assistance can be provided to communist controlled countries; the recipient must permit continuous observation of the use of U.S. supplied military items by representatives of the United States; and the recipients must refrain from engaging or preparing to engage in aggressive military action against the United States or other countries receiving American aid.⁸

The most of U.S. arms transfers today consist of sales. Each request from foreign government for American arms must pass through a complex review process that can take from a few month to few years to complete (Figure-1). All arms sales requests are reviewed by officials in at least two major departments of the executive branches. All sales having a value of \$ 14 million or more for major defense equipment, \$ 50 million or more for all other defense articles and services, and \$ 200 million or more for design and construction services must be reported to Congress, which has the power to Veto.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH: Within the executive branch, numerous department and agencies are involved in the process of reviewing sales of U.S. military equipment and services.

8. Ibid., P.24-3.

FIGURE-1
ARMS SALES REVIEW PROCESS



KEY
 DOD = Department of Defense
 FMS = Foreign Military Sales
 NATO = NATO and other close allies
 OMC = Office of Munitions Control
 \$14M = Major defense equipment
 \$50M = Other defense articles/services
 \$200M = Design/construction services

SOURCES: Adapted from Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, of Security Assistance (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 1981). P.3-22.

The main or principal participants in the review process are the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The central intelligence Agency (CIA), the Agency for International Development (AID), the office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Treasury and Commerce Department, may also become involved in reviewing specific cases. Many officials within each of these organisations will frequently participate in the review process. Up to twenty signature clearance may be required on a single arms sales request before Congress is notified of a proposed sale.⁹

Each of the department and agencies involved will have varied interests and viewpoints that will determine its position on a potential sale. Many concerns are inevitably addressed from these perspectives in the review process; for examples, the security interest of United States, its allies, and its close friends; U.S. financial, commercial, and resource interests; the strength of the relationship between the potential recipient and the United States; the recipient's rate with respect to U.S. global

9. Jo.L.Husbands, "How the united states Makes Foreign Military Sales," in Stephine G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds, Arms Transfers in the Modern World, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, p.158.

objectives; and the importance of the sale to the over all bilateral relationship and to the military balance in the relevant region.¹⁰

Arms sales consists of two types; foreign military sales (FMS) and commercial sales. FMS are transaction between governments, the U.S. government buying items from American firms and transferring them to the recipient government for cash or credit. Commercial sales occur between American companies and foreign governments, the U.S. government either approving or disapproving requests for exports licenses. There are generally five basic steps in FMS transactions: (1) the request by a foreign government or international organization for data on a US Military item or service; (2) the initial review of the request by the State Department, DOD, and other agencies followed by a decision to approve or deny release of the data; (3) the formal request initiated by the foreign government to purchase the equipment; (4) the formal review process within the executive branch and the acceptance or rejection of the request; (5) Congressional review, if required, and sale. In some instances, the foreign government may choose to by-pass the first two steps.

10. Paul. Y. Hammond, David J. Louscher, and Michael D. Soloman, "Controlling U.S. Arms Transfers: The Emerging System", Orbis, Vol.23, No.2, Summer 1979, P.328.

Many foreign govts prefer the FMS type of sale for major weapons system not only because the Department of Defense puts together a complete defense package for each transactions, but also because FMS provide foreigners government: the some legal protection as the MOD in contracting agreements with American companies.¹¹

Officials of foreign governments initially because interested in purchasing Americans Arms and military Services by attending air shows and weapons displays by American arms, by contacts with American manufactures, sales representatives, or U.S. military advisers, or by a study conducted by DOD Survey.¹² The interest in acquiring American arms may also reflect satisfaction with earlier arms purchases or a desire to develop closer relations with the United States.

Foreign governments can obtain information - commonly referred to as classified information -, the unauthorized disclosure of which damage the national security, which includes weapons and other forms of Munitions, data and manufacturing techniques.

The president established the guidelines for identifying and protecting such information in Executive order 12356 of

11. DISAM, The Management of Security Assistance, PP.11-1, and 11-2.

12. JO.L. Husbands, op.cit., P.161.

April 2, 1982¹³. Guidelines for the release of classified information to foreign state or organization on set forth in a National Security Decision Memorandum that assigns the secretaries of state and Defense Joint responsibility for controlling disclosure of information. Classified information is a national asset disclosure of which must be consistent with the U.S. foreign policy objectives and military security requirements and must serve a specific diplomatic or military national purpose. The United States does not disclose classified information unless the recipient agrees to maintain its secrecy, is judged to so, and meets such the same criteria as that in the AECA.

Foreign governments can obtain information about American arms by submitting to the State Department a letter of Request (LOR) for planning a review data (P&R) and or for price and availability data (P&A). P & R data consist of general information on the cost and capability of weapons. P & A data provide detailed information needed to submit a formal offer to buy.

Request for information on American arms on divided into three groups; first major defense requirement (for example, ships, aircrafts tanks): Second, all other defense

13. Larry M. Wortzel, op.cit. p.620.

articles and some services, (for example, spare parts, amunition and training); and third, design and construction services (for example, building airfields and other defense infrastructure).

The decisions to release data is carefully considered, because a request for arms can be easily turned down at this point in the process than later when the request becomes formal. At this early stage, the eligibility of requesting nations for FMS purchases is determined by the participants in the review process. They also see to it that whether military item or services for sale are available. They ensure that the prospective sales conforms to the policy guidelines of the current administration. They also take into account the restrictions and controls in the Arms Export Control Act, and other pertinent legislation.

The release of P & R and P & A data by DOD can occur only with state Department approval after a review by officials in the Bureau of politico-military Affairs, (P..M.), the concerned regional bureau in the Department of State, and ACDA, in Accordance with DOD.

Foreigns governments can make requests through several channels, directly to a U.S. Ambassador or his political counselors, to the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) in the country or to defense attache's, to officials

in Washington. Though their embassies, or to study teams and sales representatives of private companies. Foreign government may sometimes make direct request to the president or secretary of state.

Request for information are directed to the state Department. The Bureau of politico-military Affairs solicits the views of The responsible offices with the State Department, DOD and the ACDA. if there is any objection to the request within offices, the decision is deferred to higher State Department and DOD officials or, in special cases, to the white House. If the request is approved, then the data are released. The issuance of the data is often perceived by potential recipients as an indication that the United States is prepared to sell. If the foreign governments finds the data satisfactory and decided to purchases arms through FMS, it must submit a second request for a letter of offer and Acceptance (LOA) from the U.S. government stating that the United States in military to make the sale.¹⁴ The request for an LOA is processed through the same channels as the initial request for information noted above and represents a formal request to purchase military hardware. No LOA can be issued without State Department approval. The LOA is

14. J.O.L. Husband, op.cit. p.162.

written by the relevant military service. In cases where equipment or services of all three military branches are involved, each one participates in drafting the LOA.

Request to purchase American arms under FMS and commercial sales from NATO countries, Japan Australia, and New Zealand are generally not controversial because these countries have been the recipients of the majority of sales, although recent years there have been exceptions. The State Department processes sales requests for defense items and services to these countries and also authorized such sale. The initial review processes may occur within the sales offices of the military services and weapons requests are subjected to inter-agency review of other offices express interests.

Request from all other foreign governments can be controversial because of the country involved, the equipment requested, or to amount of the proposed sale.¹⁵ All these factors contributed to controversy over the Sale in 1981 of Air borne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and other defense items to Saudi Arabi. Request from these countries usually recieve a more extensive intergency review then those in first category.

15. JO, L. Husband, op.cit. p.163.

Request for arms sales from countries in the second categories are reported to PM and the office of International Security Affairs in DOD; These two offices act as primary managers and coordinators of the review their departments. PM also serves as the Coordinator of the interagency reviews within the executive branch.

The initial reviews is conducted by the ^{relevant} ^{bureau} regional/of the State Department. Additional review and analysis may involve ACDA, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), sales offices within the military services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, the joint chiefs of staff, and the office of the under secretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology. Each office has its own special interests and responds accordingly. The director of the Bureau of Politico-Military affairs acts on behalf of the secretary of state in most arms sales decisions. More controversial cases are referred to the secretary of state and possibly to the National Security council. (NSC).

The Arms Transfer Management Group (ATMG) is an advisory body to the secretary of state concerned with the policies and procedures for all conventional arms transfers. The ATMG is chaired by the under secretary of

state for security assistance and includes representatives of the State; Defense, and Treasury departments; the joint chiefs of staff; ACDA; the National Security Council, the Agency for International Development; CIA; and office of Management and Budget. The ATMG may examine controversial sales.

The NSC's Senior inter departmental group (SIG) dealing with foreign policy issues advises the National Security Council on arms sales.

Arms sales requests rarely generate enough controversy to warrant a meeting of the SIG and the NSC. The chairman of the SIG is the deputy secretary of state, and its other members include the deputy secretary of defense, the president's national security adviser, the Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and the director of central intelligence. The director of ACDA participates in SIG meetings devoted to arms sales issues.

The President participates in the review process only for the most controversial sales. He may follow the recommendation of the NSC, the ATMG, or the secretary of state, or he may request a summary of the positions of the departments and agencies before making his decision.

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH : The Congressional interest in arms sales grew with the rise in their volume and reflected a lack of confidence in the executive branch's decision-making process.¹⁶

All major defense-related sales must be reported to congress. Major defense equipment valued at \$ 14 million or over other defense articles or services valued at \$ 50 million or over, and design and construction services valued at \$ 200 million or over are considered major sales subject to the Nelson Amendment in the Arms Export Control Act. That amendment permits Congress to block a major sale if it passes a concurrent resolution with ⁱⁿ thirty days (fifteen days for NATO and other allies) after receiving formal notification of the intended sale from the Executive branch. In practice, Congress receives informal notification of proposed sales twenty days in advance for countries other than members of NATO, Japan, and New Zealand.¹⁷

The International security Assistant aid Arms Export Control Act was the most significant piece of legislation dealing with arms Transfers since the enactment of Mutual Security Act. It sought to "shift the focus of U.S. arms

16. Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms sales. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982, P. 50.

17. Ibid.

sales policy from that of selling arms sales to controlling arms sales and exports.¹⁸

Congress also receives quarterly reports on all LOAs for major defense equipment valued at \$ 1 million or more. The congressional review may be warned by the President if he declares that "an emergency exists which requires the proposed export in the national security interests of the United States."¹⁹

The Legislative branch is notified of major arms sales through the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These committee may hold hearings on the proposed sale if they conclude that such a review is warranted. Each committee then submits its recommendation to the full House or Senate. Congress has never passed a concurrent resolution to defeat a sale; The proposed sale of AWACS air craft to Saudi Arabi in 1981, however, did attract considerable opposition. Although the House Voted to block the sale, the Senate approve it by a Vote of 52-48. Every administration since the passage of the Nelson amendment in 1974 has questioned the constitutionality of congress's power to veto a proposed sale by concurrent resolution. The constitutionality of the legislative Veto is now being considered in the courts. The supreme court

18. U.S. Cong. Senate, Comp. on foreign Relations, ISA and AECA of 1976, Report on S.3439, 94th Cong. 2nd sess, May 14, 1976, p.10.

19. Arms Export control Act, as amended in 1981, Sec.35
(b) (1) (A)

has agreed to review a case unrelated to arms sales but the outcome may effect the power of congress to block arms sales by concurrent resolution.²⁰ Past Congressional opposition to proposed arms sales has usually been headed off through compromise with the Executive branch. President Ford, for example, to win the approval of congress, agreed to sell immobile rather than mobile to Hawk missiles to Jordan in 1975 and to limit the number of Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabi in 1976. In some cases the executive branch has withdrawn formal notification of a sale rather than risk congressional rejection.

Congress, however, cannot make U.S. policy on arm transfers. This is the job of the executive branch . Congress has given itself the right to make individual arms transfers subject to its disapproval, rather than the right to approve sales to foreign countries before they are completed.

A formal LOA is issued to the purchasing country if the proposed arms sale survives the Executive and Legislative reviews. The sale still may not be consummated, however, if

20. A three-Judge Panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., ruled in January 1982 that the Legislative Veto was unconstitutional in a case involving the pricing of natural gas. The Supreme Court has agreed to review a narrower , but similar case involving a position of immigration law. See Laura A. Kiernan and Fred Brar-bash, "Court Declares Veto by Congress Unconstitutional," Washington post, January 30, 1982.

too much time was elapsed between the initial request and final approval or if restriction placed on the sale are unacceptable to the purchasing country. The sale is complete only after the LOA has been signed by U.S. officials and representatives of the foreign government.²¹

The decisive role in formulating U.S. arms sales policy can only be undertaken by the president.

COMMERCIAL SALES : Commercial arms sales, although take place between arms manufactures and foreign government, they are reviewed by the U.S. govt. The state Department's office of Munitions Control (OMC) has primary responsibility for overseeing commercial sales. OMC must submit an advisory opinion before data on the arms or services requested a released. A export License must be issued for the actual sale, its counter part in DOD, PM, and ACDA are involved in reviewing proposed commercial sales. The National Aeronautics and space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Energy, and other government offices may be notified if the sale is of interest to them.²²

21. JO.L. Husbands, op.cit. p.167,

22. Ibid.

The OMC will disapprove a commercial sale request upon objection by PM, the regional bureau in state, ACDA, or DOD. OMC is responsible for seeking a resolution of the issue through the same interagency process followed for disputes over FMS. No export license is issued until all reservations are removed.

Congress must be notified of all proposed commercial sales of major defense equipment worth \$ 14 million or more and of all other sales of military item and services valued at \$ 50 million or more. Notification must be sent to Congress Thirty days before the issuance of an export licence. The same procedure followed by the legislative branch in reviewing FMS is followed in reviewing a commercial sale. The license is issued only if congress does not adopt a concurrent resolution within thirty days blocking the sale.

A dollar ceiling previously existed for commercial sale; all sale above it had to be FMS. The dollar ceiling was repealed in 1981, and some officials have speculated that the current mix of sales (about 10% are commercial) will change somewhat as an increasing number of transactions become commercial sales.

MAJOR LEGAL RESTRICTIONS: Existing legislation places a number of major restrictions on foreign military sales. It covers the types of countries eligible to purchase American weapons and military services, the conditions under which sales are made, and the types of weapons that can be said country-specific restriction have occasionally been legislated.

Major restrictions in the Arms Export Control Act include the following:²³

The President must determine that sales will strengthen the security of the United States and promote World peace before he can declare a country eligible to purchase American arms (Sec.3 (a) (1)).

* Country purchasing U.S. arms must agree not to transfer the arms to another country without the prior consent of the United States; such consent must be reported to Congress (Sec.3 (a) (2) and 3(b)).

* Arms sales are made only to enhance the internal security and self-defense capability of a recipient or to promote regional or collective defense arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter (Sec.4) .

23. Arms Export Control Act as amended in 1981, Sec. 36 (b) (1) (a).

- * Export-Import Banking financing of U.S. arms sales to less-developed countries is prohibited.(sec.32)
- * Arms sales cannot be made to less developed countries that divert U.S. economic or their own resources to purchase arms to the extent that such military expenditures interfere with their development (Sec.35).
- * Consequences for arms control must be considered when evaluating all arms sales (sec.42 (a) (3)).
- * Congress must be advised before co-production or licensed production agreements financed under this act are completed; the probable impact of such agreements on employment and production in the United states must be provided to Congress (sec. 42 (b)).

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTROL ON EXPORT: United States is also bound through bilateral and multilateral agreements to a regime of international controls on the export or transfer of technologies, weapons, goods, and services. The coordinating committee for Multilateral Export Control (COCOM) acts, among United States closest allies, as a consultative body which coordinates controls on exports to communist countries. COCOM controls are determined by the U.S., Japan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies,

minus Iceland and Spain.²⁴

COCOM maintains three lists of items subject to agreed multilateral controls - the International (Industrial) list, the International Munitions List, and the International Atomic Energy list - paralleling U.S. domestic control mechanisms. Although the organization had been relatively inactive, in recent years it has turned into a viable control mechanism.²⁵

Therefore, United States is not free to make unilateral decisions, because of existing International agreement, either to export strategic goods or to enter into cooperative agreements with communist countries without consulting its allies.

24. Larry M. Wortzel, Asian Survey Vol. 27, No.6, op.cit. P. 620.

25. Talbot S. Lindstorm, "Devising Fair and Effective Technology Export Controls," Defense Management Journal (first Quarter 1985), P.5

Chapter- IV

U.S. ARMS AID AND SUPPLIES

U.S. Arms Aid To The Third World

Primary goal of U.S. policy toward the Third World has been and is to maintain and strengthen regional stability (i.e. a non-war prone condition) that encourages mutually beneficial political, economic and cultural relations between the United States and other countries.

In real World of politics, foreign and domestic policies can not be neatly separated since each realm necessarily impinges on the other. This is true for the United States as well as for the smaller countries of the Third World which have received military assistance from Washington.

There are several factors which make arms sales and other forms of weapons transfers to the Third World of particular concern today. These factors are¹:- major changes occurring in the structure of the international market in the past 100 years; Several transformation in supplier motivation for trading in arms, which have undergone, are now a multifaceted set of some what conflicting

1. Debbie J. Gerner, Arms Transfers to the Third World ; Research on patterns, causes and effects. International Interaction Vol.10, 1983, PP. 5-37.

themes which are difficult for supplier and recipient nations to sort out; the uncertainty of the effect of these changes on the overall external security and stability of the Third World; uncertainty of effects arms transfers are having on the international characterisation of the recipients nations.

It is possible to identify six relatively distinct phases through which the modern arms trade has passed. During the first phase - the Pre World War I - only "small arms" were sold to any nation or group which wanted and could afford them - unknown about the possible effect of arms sales. 1920s and 1930s, The interwar years, present the second main period, and is characterised by a shift from exclusively private arms sales to some governmental involvement and by the passage of a great deal of legislation of limiting the arms trade. This set a foundation of control which still exist today, through in greatly modified form.

The year just before and during II World War represented a major shift in the nature of the arms trade and contributed the Third phase. US. lifted its ban on the sale of weapons to belligerents to allow the transfer of American destroyers to Great Britain.

The passage of the 1941 lend-lease Act made such transfer still easier, and soon the U.S. was providing large quantity of military hardware to the allied nations, particularly, Great Britain, USSR and France. The early assistance the United States to the allied force in World War II ushered in the establishment of a new pattern in the modern era, the use of arms transfers by one nation to another as an integral and enduring instrument of Foreign policy.

Fourth period of Arms transfer began after the end of World War II and extended through the 1950s. The major nations, especially the United States and Great Britain had huge surpluses of usable armaments and were more than willing to supply them to allies, often as outright grants. The U.S. as part of its cold war containment policy, was the leader during this period, supplying, weapons not only to European nation where U.S. troops were stationed but later in small amounts to Chiang Kai-Shek's forces in China, and to other nations in which the United States perceived its strategic interest to be at stake. These include, Greece and Turkey, Iran, Indonasia, the newly independent Phillipines, South Africa, South Korea and Japan.²

2. SIPRI, Year Book 1975.

Fifth phase was a transition period which lasted from around 1960 until the 1973 Arab-Israel War and the Oil embargo. Continuing the pattern began in the late 1950s, the arms trade shifted from among the industrialized nations to predominantly between developed and Third World countries. This flow of arms to Third World nations was accompanied by a movement toward the majority of transactions taking the form of sales or co-production agreements rather than grants or aid. These also arose a renewed concern in the Third World about the effects of militarism on arms suppliers and recipients. Increased U.S. involvement in South East Asia accentuated these concerns.

The greatest changes in the arms market have occurred in the present phase. This period can be characterised by three traits:- a tremendous upsurge in both the quality and quantity of arms sold to the Third World, an increase in the number of nations with the capability of supplying weapons and the increased importance of economic factors in determining arms sales. Obviously the growth in the arms trade has been astronomical particularly in the Third World. Roughly 75% of major conventional weapons traded now go to the Third World. Between 1977 and 1980, three imports were valued at nearly \$ 40 billion (measured in constant 1975 dollars)³. And since the recipients nations

3. SIPRI, Year Book 1981, p.110

are now generally customers rather than beneficiaries of military grants they have more control over what weapons they obtain. Often this means demanding - and receiving - modern top-line military equipment right off the production line which is virtually identical to that used by the supplier nations.

Middle East:

Among the Third World, the Middle East, is the primary arms importing area, with a long and active history of transfers. Between 1976 and 1980, 46% of major weapons sent to the Third World went to this area. Infact, the eight [•]haviest third World importing countries between 1970 and 1979, seven were Middle Eastern countries; Iran, Libya, Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan.⁴

The United States selles nearly \$ 10 billion worth of major weapons system a year, and weapons sales cover about five percent of all U.S. exports. About \$ 3 billion worth of these arms go to the Middle East, or roughly One Third of all U.S. annual arms sales. This currently gives the U.S. about a 20 percent share of deliveries to the Middle East arms market.⁵

4. Ibid.

5. U.S. Middle East Aid; Some question, Defense and Foreign Affairs 14(6); June 1986, pp. 15-18.

This trend in U.S. market share is steadily downwards. The U.S. had over 30% of the Middle East arms deliveries during 1977-1980, and 40% during 1973-76. Further the share in new agreements is for worse. The U.S. had a 46% share of all new agreements during 1973-76. It had a 29% share during 1977-80, and only a 17% share during 1981-84.⁶ This reflects a steadily accelerating Arab tendency to turn to other arms suppliers.

This loss of market share has a number of causes but the principle cause is undoubtedly U.S. inability to sell weapons to Arab World because of congressional sensitivity over the potential threat to Israel, and broader Arab reaction to U.S. political and strategic ties to Israel. It has cost the U.S. about \$ 1.5 - 3.0 billion annually since 1981.⁷

Arms are only part of the U.S. military Sale to the Middle East, however, and the total volume of U.S. military exports includes construction, other equipment, services etc. There is no precise way to estimate the total amount of such military export, since there is a strong incentive not to report the sale of any goods or services that do not require licensing. Nevertheless, it is possible to get rough estimate of the value of such sales by examiningⁱⁿ

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

12

the relevent aspects of the U.S. security assistance programme, and by adding the total of FMS deliveries, FMS construction deliveries, MAP aid, and commercial arms licenses.

Data published by the Defense Security assistance agency indicate that FMS deliveries to the Middle East have recently averaged around \$ 4 billion a year; Military assistance programme deliveries have declined to less than \$ 10 million a year and are not a significant component of recent U.S. military Sales, although this is somewhat misleading sales to the Middle East all worth about \$ 6 billion a year, or 1.6% of all U.S. exports in 1984 dollars.⁸

Middle East's arms sales has been the more controversial and more central to U.S. foreign policy than any other regions of the World. This region can be defined geographically as stretching from Morocco at the Western tip of North Africa through the core Middle East area running from Egypt through the levant to the persian Gulf. The core area of the Middle East and persian Gulf has been among the most volatile regions of the world during the past decade. It has been the crucible for ethnic, tribal religious cleavages, territorial disputes, irredentist

8. Ibid.

struggles and regional rivalries. It has also become central to U.S. foreign and defense policy planning and vital to the interests of the Western alliance. Because of the Soviet Union's involvement in the region and its efforts to undermine regimes friendly to the United States and the West, the region has also become a centerpiece in East-west competition.

Any consideration of major arms sales requests from the Middle East gets entangled in complex foreign policy, defense and domestic politics. It would be desirable of course to weigh each request for U.S. military assistance or arms sales on purely local or regional grounds, but Soviet involvement, in this region, particularly among radical states makes this impossible. The regional issues themselves are complex and subject to sudden change. To cope with the crosscutting internal, regional and international issues, the United States has consistently pursued some basic foreign and defense policy objectives that have included the following.⁹ The first is the fundamental commitment to the existence and security of Israel. Second, the U.S. has sought to prevent Arab-Israeli armed conflict, not only to safeguard Israel but also to avoid a direct confrontation in the area with the USSR, which would have

9. Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Arms Sales And The Middle East, Journal of International Affairs 40 (1); Summer 1986, pp. 23-31.

global implication. Third the continued flow of Oil from the Middle east has been a vital interest, which took on greater significance during the 1970s as the West's dependence on oil from the area grew. Fourth, the U.S. has sought to limit Soviet influence and presence in the region because of the high geopolitical stakes. These considerations have led the U.S. to play a major role in the region through diplomacy, and through economic and military forms of assistance.

As regards Iran the failure to think through fully the repercussions and possible costs of the maximum transfer of arms to Iran was a principal aspect of the debacle of U.S. policy in that country and may have contributed to the creation of conditions that led to the overthrow of the Shah. Iran for quite a few years was the largest recipient of U.S. arms and yet there was no carefully formulated U.S. policy on arms sales to Iran or the Persian Gulf states, this is revealed by the fact that for years the American bureaucracy was unable to agree upon an authoritative document on the subject. It was widely understood that the U.S. had a major interest in a pro-western and strong Iran, because of the strategic location of this resource - rich country on the underbelly of the USSR, and a link between the Near East and South Asia. The continuous flow of oil was vital to the economies

of the West. The sale of arms to Iran, it was understood, would help ensure the friendly relations upon which the supply of oil depended and would be a form of insurance against political instability in the country and region as a whole. It would also help to recycle the large amounts of petro dollars which were paying for the oil.

Doubts about the wisdom of arms sales to Iran were voiced in the Congress and in the press, and were known to exist in corners of the U.S. government, but they were not allowed to challenge the existing policy.

The approach of the Nixon and Ford administrations was set in May 1972 when the President and Secretary of state Kissinger assured the Shah during their visit to Iran that the U.S. would sell them any non-nuclear weapons system he wanted.¹⁰ It should be noted that it was before the Oil crisis and the onset of the rise in the price of oil. Ostensibly, the thinking at the time was that with the British withdrawing from the Persian Gulf, Iran was to become its new "protector". This also fit in well with the Nixon doctrine of placing greater reliance upon regional powers and their military force. When Iran's oil revenues multiplied, beginning a year and a half

10. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, Staff Report to the subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, 94th Congress, 2nd session, July 1976, p.41.

later and leading to the enormous arms purchases, the policy was not reviewed.

This meant, in effect, that the U.S. was implicitly accepting Iran's own perception of threat to its security, It also accepted Tehran's assessment of the amount and level of sophistication of the military weapons its forces would require. Until 1977 there was little inclination to suggest restraints on Iran's buying spree, to question specific requests or to discuss with Iranian officials the nature of their strategic requirements. In his memories Kissinger tells that Nixon ordered that "in the future Iranian request should not be "second-guessed"¹¹.

In his last years in power, where Iran was accumulating even larger and more advanced quantities of arms, he came to regard the U.S. as a less certain ally. America was seen as so consumed by the Vietnam experience as to make it unreliable in the long-run competition with the USSR.

Arms sales to Iran shot up during the 1970s from 1950 to 1971, U.S. sales were limited to a total of \$ 1.2 billion, but during the next seven years the cumulative total jumped to about \$ 21 billion. For 1977 alone the

11. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and co., 1979) P.1254.

figure was \$ 5.7 billion¹². This made the American sales programme to Iran the largest in the world. About 80 F-14S and 160 F-16S were sold to Iran, there being among the most advanced of the latest generation of American fighters. The Shah had planned to make Iran a regional super-power by the Mid 1980s.

The basic premise underlying America's almost unquestioning support for the Shah of Iran was that he was a rock of stability in a highly volatile region of increasing importance to the U.S. The sale of arms to Iran in unprecedented amounts was primarily for the purpose of enhancing American influence in that country. The U.S. in failing to examine the possible long term consequences of its arms sales to Iran, exhibited a degree of irresponsibility or shortsightedness seldom matched in the post war period.

The influence the transfer of arms was intended to provide was uncertain and finally transitory. The U.S. did not make Iran a military power capable of maintaining the strategic equilibrium in its part of the world.¹³ The bilateral relationship, in which arms transfer played an important role, created counterpressures

12. U.S., Department of Defence, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, December 1978.

13. Andrew J. Pierre, The Global politics of Arms Sales, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 28.

in Iran which made the U.S. far less welcome.

Still, U.S. arms remain in Iran in large quantities. Technology has outlined the political relationship. In transferring weapons the long term risks and dangers must be weighed as carefully as the short term benefits and profits.

Israel: Israel's fundamental insecurities which have deep roots in the history and experience of its people, have been countered by putting the emphasis on offensive forces, notably air and armoured, which are designed to disrupt and destroy an enemy quickly, and to keep the battle at a distance. Now, Israel is militarily by far the strongest country in the Middle East, Israel's strength is in substantial measure due to the U.S., which since Israel's creation, has been a major supplier of economic and military assistance. In many ways America has been Israel's sponsor and protector, even though the latter role has not been embodied in a written guarantee.

Israel has been after the 1967 war, increasingly dependent on United States, arms, specially for higher performance Jet Aircraft.¹⁴ The U.S. arms supplies to Israel is accelerated after the yom kippur War of 1973.

14. William B. Ovardt, Influence Through Arms Supply: The U.S. Experience in the Middle East, ed. by Uri Ra'anem Robert L. Pfatt Zgraff Jr. and Geoffery Kemp, Praeger Publisher West view Press, 1978, PP.120-130.

Military assistance from the U.S. rise from \$ 307.5 million in 1973 to 2.48 billion in 1974 following the yom kipper War, and arms to \$ 1.5 billion in 1976 and approximately \$ 1 billion in each of the next two years.¹⁵

Despite this close arms relationship there has been a longstanding difference between American and Israeli defense planners regarding the Arab Israeli military balance in the middle east and the scale of military threat to Israel. Often the U.S. has found itself arguing that the Arab threat has been overestimated and deciding that the list of requests should be pared down without harming Israel's ability to win a war. A secret pentagon study in 1979 reportedly concluded that Israel had enough military power to repel any Arab attack between them and 1984, and that any increase in the transfer of American arms to Israel beyond those already authorized would be destabilizing.¹⁶

Any American President before adopting a tough stance towards Israel would be conditioned in his approach by the existence of the American Jewish community and domestic

15. Pierrie, op.cit.

16. "U.S. confident on Israeli Arms", New York Times, November 18, 1979.

political considerations.

Egypt: Following the Palestine War of 1947-49 Egypt sought arms from the U.S. a search that was reinforced after Nasser came to power in 1952. However, Nasser never received the arms he felt he needed for the confrontation with Israel. It was this frustration that led to arms accord with Moscow.

Sadats objective was to rely instead on the west for arms, However, he received very little from the U.S. as the American administrations were reluctant to begin a true arms relationship with Egypt even after the Soviet were cut, because of the view that Congress, always sensitive to Israeli concerns would not permit it. Hence despite Sadat's repeated request only insignificant "nonlethal" arms were approved by the Washington.

Between 1976 and 1979, West European Countries were the largest suppliers of arms to Egypt. Yet it was the American arms that Sadat really wanted. The reasons were not merely that they might be technologically superior in some cases, or they might be had with more favourable terms. More important was their political symbol. Sadat took a major gamble in inviting Soviets and planning all confidence on the Americans, a gamble whose

seriousness and risk were magnified when he signed the camp David agreement against the wishes of the most of the other Arab States, thereby isolating himself. American arm-would be a visible proof that the United States had become Egypt's "partners" as he wanted it is to be in the Middle East. Finally following the revolution of Iran, Sadat suggested that Egypt might logically replace Iran as Americas surrogate in the Middle East. Sadat was not shy about asking for U.S. arms. He argued that they would be used not to attack Israel, but to give Egypt "equivalent bargaining power".

What may have appeared as brawado in 1978 looked more like reality in 1980. After signing of the Camp David accords, Egypt became an ever increasing beneficiary of U.S. arms. As part of the camp David package, Egypt received \$ 1.5 billion in military credits. In early 1980 the carter administration presented the Congress with Project 'Peace Vector' under which Egypt was to receive an additional \$ 1.1 billion in military credits in the following two fiscal years.¹⁷ By for the more significant element of this, however, was the announced intention to allow Cairo to purchase both the F-15 and F-16 in the future. This would "open the door" in the words of egyptian minister of Defense, Lt.. General Kamal Hasan

17. Pierrie op.cit.

Ali, to what was estimated as a needed \$ 5 billion to \$ 10 billion arms modernising programme,¹⁸ as the U.S. reportedly no longer restrict^{ed} the types of weapons that Egypt could choose. Egypt has thus achieved systematic equality with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Thus Sadat had succeeded in using cooperation with the U.S. in the Camp David process to achieve equal rights in the Americans arms market.

A far reaching defense relationship appeared to be in the making. The U.S. concerned by developments in the Persian Gulf and South West Asia, began looking for bases in the Middle East that could be used to project its military power. Egypt offered the use of naval facilities at Ras Banas on the Red Sea and an air base at Cairo west to which U.S. Air Force units were deployed in a rotational basis. The Reagan administration shortly after coming into office agreed to explore the development of a five- year plan for upgrading Egypt's armed forces.

The question that this caused, however was whether some day the U.S. could find itself in a situation comparable to its experience in Iran. The U.S. involvement in Egypt has become increasingly open

18. Ibid.

ended. Yet Egypt does not have a clearly established method of transferring power from one leader to another. No one can foretell the future turn of Egyptian politics or foreign policy.

Saudia Arabia: The U.S. has been accorded a special role in safeguarding the Security of Saudi Arabia for over a quarter-century. Explicitly it has been the nation's protector. This was initially the natural concomitant of the arrangement with the Arabian American Oil Company made in 1938 for developing the country's oil production. To assist the Saudi government a U.S. military training mission was established in 1953. The next year the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed construction of a military airfield at Dhahran. Since then the corps of Engineers has been deeply involved in supervising construction activities in Saudia Arabia with the purpose of creating a military, infrastructure for the nation. A large part of what is classified^S by the U.S. government as its foreign military sales to Saudia, approximately 60% is actually in the form of construction, logistical facilities and training.¹⁹

As the same time the U.S. has also been the largest supplier of weapons in the wake of the Iranian revolution.

19. Pierre, op. cit.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown made a trip to Saudi Arabia in 1979 after which the U.S. agreed to sell additional missiles and to construct a \$ 1.5 billion system of shelters for aircraft. And on its last day in office, the Carter administration approved another arms deal of \$ 2 billion in assorted military equipment & services²⁰. By the end of 1970's Saudi Arabia had far surpassed Iran as the largest peace time recipient of U.S. arms (in sales rather than deliveries).

By far the most important & controversial American sale to Saudi Arabia (prior to the Regan administration's proposed sale of AWWACS) was that of sixty F-15 Eagle Fighters, which were part of the Middle East "plane package" of 1978. This sale acquired tremendous symbolic significance. In Saudi minds, the recommendation of sales by the executive branch and its approval by the Congress. (or more correctly, the unwillingness of the Congress to exercise its right to veto) became the litmus test for the existence of what many perceived to be a "special relationship".²¹ For this reason it merits close examination.

20. Ibid.

21. Pierre, Andrew J., "Beyond the 'Plane Package': Arms and Politics in the Middle East", International Security, 3, Winter 1978/1979, pp.138-92.

The Ford administration followed the Nixon Doctrine's stated preference for building of the power of friendly states in important regions so as to permit a more selective American world wide engagement. The Saudis wanted the latest F-15 and Ford assured them that they would have the fighter of their choice.

Accordingly, the Carter administration came into office with its options substantially circumvented by the pledge made to the Saudis. Although the pledges fulfillment would contradict at least in spirit, President Carter's new arms transfer policy, the administration concluded after much internal debate that the increasingly important Saudi-U.S. relationship could not stand a policy reversal on the F-15 and that such a step would adversely affect the administration's emerging policy with respect of the crucial Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. However, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency opposed the sale on the grounds that it would lead other countries in the Middle East to seek comparable aircraft thus contributing to an accelerated arms competition in the region. Anyway the President succeeded in convincing the Congress that the package would not upset the military balance in the region.²²

22. Pierre Op. cit. P.212.

A new controversy came to the fore in 1981 over the Reagan administration's intention to sale the Saudis extra fuel tanks, advanced air-to-air Sidewinder missiles, and possibly bomb racks for F-15 fighters, in addition to five AWACS electronic surveillance plane & some aerial tanker aircraft. It was agreed that it was necessary because of the increased Soviet threat to the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. Critics of the sale were primarily concerned by the additional threat this would present to the security of Israel. But to see in favour of the sale underscored its desirability^{it} for paving the way for eventually placing U.S. forces or, short of that stockpiles of U.S. equipment in Saudi Arabia to be used in case of any emergency.

Arms & Oil have rarely been explicitly linked it is not necessary, it is understood. An exception occurred during the week of the Senate hearings on the "plane package", when Shaikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister, warned that a refusal to sale the F-15 would have an adverse affect on the country's oil production policy & its support for the Dollar. Given that the Saudis were being asked to pump more oil than their revenues required, his comments that Saudi friendship & willingness to help the U.S. were not to be disregarded.²³ On another, occasion

23. "Yamani Warns oil policy is linked to the sale of F-15" Washington Post, May, 1978.

on announcement by Saudi Arabi in July 1979 that it would increase its oil production by a million barrels a day was quickly followed by an American approval of a \$ 1.2 billion additional arms request for the Saudi National Guard. A Link between the two was widely perceived, despite official denials.²⁴

In the Reagan Administration total "FMS aid request for the M.E. totaled \$ 3.09 billion in FY 1985, and \$ 646 billion in FY 1986, and \$ 3.635 proposed for FY 1987. Virtually all of these aid is in the form of grant aid to two countries". Egypt and Israel will get "85% in FY 85, 60% in FY 86, and 85% in FY 87".²⁵ Jordan Tunisia, and Oman are the only other significant recipients of FMS aid in the Middle East, as they receive only token amounts. Morocco has also become charity customer in recent years. It is no longer receives FMS credits and rely heavily on MPA grants, same is the case with Tunisia and Yemen.²⁶

24. "U.S. to Sell Saudis \$ 1.2 billion in Arms" New York Times, July 14, 1979; "Oil bans Get a bigger Bang for the Barrel, " New York Times, July 15, 1979.

25. U.S. Middle East-Aid: Some Question. Defense and Foreign Affairs 14(6): June 1986 PP, 13-18.

26. Ibid. p.17.

ASIA: Asia is the second largest arms recipient in the developing world. According to ACDA Statistics, arms transfers to Asia between 1969 and 1978 came to \$ 34.4 billion of which \$ 18.2 billion went to the two Vietnams, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.²⁷ There are very important arms sales issues in the region, the impact of sales to the people's Republic of China and Taiwan on Soviet - American and Sino-American relations; the maintenance of the two Koreas, and the prevention of escalation in the Indo-Pakistan arms race.

South Korea: Korea has been the largest recipient of arms, with the exception of the two Vietnams, and has relied almost exclusively for its more advanced weapons on the U.S. From the beginning of Korean War to 1970 the U.S. provided more than \$ 7.8 billion²⁸ in military assistance in the form of Govt. aid, excess defense articles, foreign military sales credits and military education and training. By the end of 1978, the South Korean armed forces had sent 34,225 officers and men to the U.S. for training. In addition, Seoul has benefited from U.S. technological assistance in the establishment of an indigenous arms manufacturing industry.

27. ACDA, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer 1969-1978, pp. 117-158.

28. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales.

Despite the close ties interest in this security relationship, South Korea's relation with the U.S. have been far from trouble free. The authoritarian nature of President Park Ching Hee's government and its alleged violation of human rights and suppression of the opposition, as well as the Korean internal intelligence Agency attempt to bribe U.S. Congressmen, perturbed many Americans. Commersely. South Korea could not understand or accept the early decision of the Carter Administration to withdraw American grand combat force from the country, arguing that it was underestimating the magnitude of militaty threat from the North. However President Reagan promised that U.S. forces would remain indefinitely.

Nevertheless, as a result of the withdrawal initiative the U.S. committed itself to a vast program of arms sales. To preserve the military balance on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. agreed in 1977 to modernize and strengthen Republic of Korea forces with \$ 2 billion in equipment.²⁹ As part of the "compensatory measure" for the U.S. withdrawls, Seoul was promised military sales credits over a five-year period. In addition, stockpiles of equipment with the U.S. forces in Korea were to be turned over to Korean forces. Here, U.S. has an instance of a receipient country, long dependent upon outside supplier, that had substantially

29. Pierre. op.cit.

improved its security and its economic conditions-yet, ironically, the "price" of that progress was a still greater sale of arms to facilitate a partial U.S. withdrawal.

The U.S. must, however, carefully calibrate its arms sales to Seoul so as to maintain the regional balance of power and not allow North Korea to feel threatened by the possibility of South Korea launching an offensive. If the South Korean were to become overarmed, it might give Pyongyang leverage over Moscow sufficient to induce Moscow to resolve their differences and resume large scale arms shipments; this time of highly advanced arms. A competitive arms race on the peninsula would not be in the interest of U.S., South Korea or China. Thus co-production of arms aircraft and missiles-which Seoul wants should be approached with caution.³⁰

Taiwan: The next largest recipient in Asia is Taiwan. It is economically prosperous and militarily well-equipped. Ostensively, Taiwan's strategic goal is to attack the mainland and recover the lost territory, realistically, its arms forces need only be adequate to deter or defend against an invasion of Taiwan. Its armed forces have for many years been generally equipped by the U.S. with \$ 5.2 billion in grants or sales from 1950 to the end of 1979.³¹

30. Pierre, op.cit. p.218.

31. Ibid.

American planners have carefully restricted assistance to defensive arms, with emphasis on naval and air weapons defensive, in quantities more than sufficient to prevent an invasion or air attack from mainland.

The normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington at the end of 1978 created a new political situation for Taiwan. To a great extent the question of American Arms sales to Taiwan was an important dimension of both the process of normalization and its consequence. Beijing had long insisted upon these conditions for normalization : a shift in formal diplomatic relations with China from Taipei to Beijing, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan, and the abrogation of 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan. After signing of the Shanghai communique in 1972 U.S. forces on the island were reduced from 10,000 to nominal 750,³² who were performing non combatant functions. The Carter administration was prepared not only to shift recognition from Taipei to Beijing but also to withdraw the remaining U.S. military personnel and end the treaty. The latter was done after normalization by giving one years notice as provided in the treaty itself, rather than through abrogation. But an impose remained since the U.S. insisted that it would continue the sale of arms to Taiwan. This was

32. Ibid.

essential to avoid the appearance and reality of abandoning the island. The breakthrough that ultimately made possible the normalization process was the concession by Beijing ~~to~~ proceed even though it recognized that the U.S. intended to continue supply of defensive arms to Taiwan in the face of PRC objections. ~~Beijing~~ denounced the U.S. sale of weapons to Taiwan while the U.S. it subsequently was revealed, agreed not to make any fresh commitment for sale of arms for one year until termination of the treaty. Meanwhile, however, the supplies in the pipeline, which came to about \$ 800m would continue to flow, and Washington made clear that new sales would be made again, starting at the end of 1980 at end of the moratorium.³³

The management of the arms relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan has been and will continue to be closely linked to the evaluation of United States Calculations with Beijing. Washington's concern is that Taiwan ^{does} not receive offensive weapons capable of being used against the mainland, yet possesses adequate arms to ensure its security. Taiwan's interests - on the other hand, are likely to lead it towards reducing its hitherto almost complete dependence upon the U.S. for arms.

33. "Peking Concession on Arms to Taipei led to U.S. Accord". New York Times, December 17, 1978.

SOUTH ASIA: From the U.S. point of view security problem in South Asia were perceived to fall into two categories; intrusive threats emanating from across the subcontinent because of Chinese and Soviet involvement in the region; and core threats within the subcontinent especially those between India and Pakistan.³⁴ The importance of the core security threats was both dependent and subordinate to the U.S. global strategy.

Thus, U.S. Security policy in Southern Asia was initially formulated in the larger framework of a monolithic communist threat to the "free world". Attempts were made in the 1950s to draw both India and Pakistan into anticommunist alliance networks. Pakistan responded positively and joined the 1954 SEATO and 1955 Baghdad (later CENTO) defense pacts. On the other hand, India under Nehru rejected the American offer, which was perceived to carve the world into two armed camps. Instead, Nehru insisted that security was best maintained through a policy of non alignment and declaration of peaceful coexistence.³⁵

34. Brands Categories the involved State in Southern Asia into "core", "Peripheral", and "intrusive" members. The core members are India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh; the peripheral members are Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan; and the intrusive members are the Soviet Union, China and the United States. See, William J. Brands, "Regional System: South Asia", in Rosenow, Thompson, and Boyd, eds, World Politics, pp. 504-512.

35. For a discussion, See Raju G.C. Thomas, "Non alignment and Indian Security: Nehru's Rationale and Legacy", Journal of Strategic Studies 2.2 (Sept. 1979) pp. 153-171.

The positive Pakistani response enabled it to receive some \$730 million in offensive military equipment which included M-47/48 Patton tanks, and F-46 Sabre and F-104 Starfighter combat aircraft³⁶. Another \$ 1.3 billion was provided in logistic support systems in the form of communications equipment and training programs. Subsequently, the 1962 Sino-India war briefly drew India into the Orbit of when the Kennedy administration provided India with some \$ 85 million in military aid in the form of light mountain guns, transport planes and helicopters and winter clothing.³⁷

Strong objection from Pakistan kept U.S. military aid limited, and with the outbreak of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, military aid to both countries was discontinued. Before the Indo-Pak war of 1965, Pakistan received most of its arms from the U.S. under the SEATO and CENTO defense pacts to counter the Sino-Soviet Communist threat.³⁸

36. Testimony given by Townsend Hooper principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, to the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, U.S. Senate, 19th Congress, First Session (Washington D.C.: Government printing Office, 1967.)

37. The figure of \$ 85 million was obtained from William J. Brands; India, Pakistan and Great Powers, New York: Praeger Publisher, 1972, P.323.

38. Rajan G.C. Thomas; Security Relationship in Southern Asia: Differences in Indian and American perception, Asian Survey Vol. XXI (7) July, 1981, PP. 689-709.

As a member of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan was seen as a bulwork of anticommunism. As India in that War received arms mainly from Britain, U.S. and British arms then to some extent used against each other in that war. Hence London and Washington decided to improve on arms embargo on both the participants.³⁹ This embargo lasted untill 1975, during which time Pakistan had started developing an arms industry, even though on a far more modest scale than India. It asked the U.S. for an intermediate level Jet-fighter-the A-7, but its request were turned down by the Carter administration on the ground that it would give too great an offensive capability against India.⁴⁰ The U.S. was however, receptive to supplying a shorter range aircraft, After 1976, the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which forbids military and economic assistance credit to countries believed to be developing a nuclear weapons capability, was also a limiting factor.

After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war the basic antagonism and threats to each other were perceived to defy United States mediation, but unfortunately to be of minor relevance to problems of global security. This attitude prevailed untill the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when the importance of the region was substantially revalued.

39. Pierre, op.cit. p.215

40. Ibid.

Shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration, percieving the Russian troops on the border of Pakistan as a new threat to the region, urgently sought to provide, assitance to Pakistan, and provided \$ 400 Million in immediate economic and military aid.⁴¹ And with more to come.⁴² At the same time Carter administration also sought the cooperation and understanding from India.⁴³

A new page was turned, however, after the Regan administration, came into office. Whereas the Carter administration had limited its military assistance offer to "defensive" arms Pakistan was now offered a large five year package worth \$ 3 billion that included the F-16,⁴⁴ a sale that have previously been refused. Even the U.S. Airforce had reservation about the F-16. However, political considerations appear to have been peramount, as the Reagan administration gave priority to countering the Soviet threat emanating from the Hindu Kush & Indus Valley in Afghanistan.

41. Asian Survey, Op. cit., PP.689-709.

42. Pierre, Op. cit., P.217.

43. See New York Times, January 1 and 6, 1980; and Times of India, January 8, 1980. President Ziaul Haque, who called this offer "peanuts" Subsequently rejected the offer on the grounds that it would only invite the hostility of Soviet Union without bringing Pakistan much security.

44. Pierre, Op. cit., P.218.

Apart from these cases, there were special and occasional U.S. interest in Pakistan because of its links with the Islamic World and close ties with China. These connections have carried some benefits to the United States. Pakistan's ties with China, for instance, provided Secretary of State Kissinger and President Nixon the Diplomatic channel to Beijing in 1971-1972.

Islamic revivalism and growing solidarity between Pakistan and some of the oil-rich states of the Middle East, the fall of the Shah and the general failure of U.S. in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have all suddenly increased the importance of the subcontinent, and especially Pakistan, in the calculus of U.S. global strategy to counter Soviet move in the region.

The Carter administration initially perceived the invasion as the prelude to a wider Soviet design in South West Asia, a belief that is more firmly held by the Reagan administration. According to some U.S. assessments, Soviet backing of the Baluchi Separatist movement would bring it within the reach of the India Ocean through Afghanistan, while the continued subjugation of Afghanistan would facilitate a Soviet military thrust towards the oil fields of the Persian Gulf⁴⁵.

45. See various assessments by Drew Middleton, Richard Burt, Bernard Gwertzman, Terrence Smith, and Eric Pace, in The New York Times, December 20, 23, and 27, 1979, Jan. 9, 11, 24, and 25, 1980, and February 2, 1980.

Gorbachev's initiative has resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But the U.S. interest in Pakistan will continue to persist, because of Pakistan's link with Saudi Arabia and other important U.S. friends in the Arabian peninsula with 10,000 troops in Saudi Arabia and sizeable contingents in Kuwait, Oman and the UAE.⁴⁶ Pakistan makes an important contribution to military preparedness in all of those countries and also to internal security in Saudi Arabia. Although Pakistan publicly takes the opposition that it is opposed to the military presence of both super powers in the Gulf and there is, therefore, no question of a strategic consensus with the United States in that region.⁴⁷

It is, therefore, insisted that dealing with Pakistan's insecurities by selling conventional weapons & reestablishing a relationship of confidence was the best way in the long run, to restrain Islamabad's nuclear ambitions, and for the fulfillment of U.S. interest in that region.

46. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-87, London, 1986.

47. See then Foreign Minister Agha Shai's speech to newspaper editors in Lahore, June 30, 1981, reproduced in R.K. Jain, ed., U.S. South Asian Relations, 1947-1982, Vol.2 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983).

LATIN AMERICA: Prior to the mid 1960's the U.S. dominated the arms sales market in Latin America, but now the diversity of supplier is greater there. Now the West European continued to sell twice as much as the U.S. to Latin American countries.⁴⁸

Under the Carter administration human rights were the prime considerations in U.S. decisions on arms sales to Latin America & this accounts for the low level of transfers. A number of restrictions initiated by the liberal Democrats, were mandated by the Congress prior to the Carter administration, in reaction, to the previous administration continuing close ties with some of the most repressive regimes in South America. But it was President Carter who brought the human right issue to the fore, here as elsewhere. A state department report in the spring of 1977, critical of the human rights in Brazil led the country to suspend a longstanding military assistance agreement and reject \$ 50 million in credits for arms (due to be cancelled in any case). With accompanying criticisms of U.S. moralizing and interference in Domestic Affairs. Similar responses came from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador Guatemala. Under existing legislation,

48. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969-1978, P.162.

as forcefully interpreted by the Carter administration, these countered were no longer eligible to receive U.S. arms. Very specific prohibitions were also enacted by the Congress with regard to Argentina and Chile.⁴⁹

In Latin America it has been the development of influence and good relations with the country, rather than security concerns, that has been the traditional justification for U.S. arms transfers. Military assistance programmes have been seen as an effective way of maintaining professional contacts and access to important elites.⁵⁰ The new American policy obviously angered and alienated the target countries. It was seen by many conservative countries not only as an act of foreign interference in their internal affairs but also as an affront to their nation's dignity. This was specially true of the military leaders, who consider themselves natural friends of the U.S. And more than one American Ambassador in the field privately bemoaned the loss of arms sales as an instrument of influence and leverage.

Washington can be faulted for inconsistency in applying the human rights standard. Latin American countries

49. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Arms trade in the Western Hemisphere Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd session., June-Aug, 1978, pp. 3-4.

50. See John Samuel Fitch, "The Political Impact of U.S. Military Aid to Latin America," Armed forces and Society (Spring 1979) pp. 360-386.

has been deprived of the opportunity to purchase arms, but other countries with regrettable practices, such as South Korea, Iran under Shah and Phillipines, have not had similar difficulties. This may well be perfectly justifiable, given the broader political, economic and security considerations that affect U.S. policy towards those countries, but it is nonetheless true that Latin America thereby tends to become the repository for ideals that cannot be carried elsewhere. The "big stick" approach of human rights has been applied far more to Latin America than to any other region thus creating understandable resentment.

The Reagan administration as it came into office approach Latin America from a different perspective. The primary concern was hemispheric security and the competition for influence with the USSR rather than human rights or economic development. A new strategic importance was given to the Atlantic coast of South America. This would require closure cooperation with the military of those two countries to strengthen naval and air control of the South Atlantic Sea lanes. Another perceived threat which was given great weight was Soviet-Cuba sponsored expansionist and subversive activities in Central America and the Caribbean.

Given these priorities, the approach towards arms sales and contacts with Latin American military regimes was considerably different than that in the Carter years. Washington now sought to improve relations with these regimes. The Reagan administration asked the Congress to lift the embargoes which had been applied to a number of Latin American nations, including Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala. As officials turned to the need for hemispheric defense planning, the past restrictions in weapons transfers seemed like an anachronism.

U.S. ARMS AID TO ALLIES

Just after the World War II, when security assistance Programme started, U.S. policymakers viewed security assistance as an important and flexible instrument for the pursuit of U.S. foreign and defense policy objectives.⁵¹ It has been used to help friendly and allied nations acquire and maintain the capability to defend themselves, serving both specific U.S. national interests and collective security of the free world. It has been used to demonstrate tangible U.S. support for nations whose defense was deemed vital to U.S. security. Security assistance has also been used to supplement economic aid when U.S. policymakers judged that a country backed the

51. Richard F. Grimmet, "The Role of Security Assistance in Historical Perspective, In Ernest Graves, Steven A. Hiderth eds. U.S. security of assistance: The Political Process, Lexington Book, 1985, p.2.

means to provide for its own defense, or that dimension of its resources from economics development to defense spending would prove counter productive. It has also been employed in conjunction with a commitment to use U.S. military power if need be to deter regional conflict or to keep such conflict at the lowest possible level when it occurred.

To understand the role played by the security assistance program in U.S. foreign policy. It is necessary to examine the origin of the concept of collective security in the period immediately after World War II and the relationship of that concept to security assistance.

The concept of collective security in the post World War II period had its origin in the shattered hopes for a lasting reconciliation between communist and non communist Worlds. It also stemmed from the "lessons" learned from World Wars I and II. That "preemptive" alliances could deter conflict and that to refrain from entering into alliances until conflict had begun increased the risk of War. United Nations had not fulfilled the expectations of its founders to serve as a major bulwork of international order. The Soviet Union began to exploit the economic and political dislocation in Europe and Asia caused by the War to advance its own foreign policy ends, which, were clearly at variance with those of United States.

The first phase in the Soviet Union's expansion of its power in Eastern Europe was the consolidation of its effective authority in such countries as Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. With Soviet troops already in these countries it was easy to create puppet governments subservient to Moscow. In 1946 and 1947 the Soviet Union attempted to press its interests in the Mediterranean and Near East through a series of threatening actions.⁵² In early 1948 the USSR initially refused to withdraw its troops from Iran, hoping to maintain a presence in that strategically located state. The strong response of the United States and Great Britain indicated that they were prepared to use force to protect Iran and led the Soviets to withdraw their forces.

In August 1946 the Soviets demanded that Turkey revise the 1936 Montreux convention governing passage through the Turkish straits into the Aegean from the Black sea. Acquiescence to this demand would have given the Russians domination over Turkey as well as administrative control of Turkey straits. The United States responded to this Soviet demand by sending a naval task force to the Mediterranean. Two weeks later the United States rejected the Soviet demand. In the face of this firm opposition, the Soviets backed off from their initiative.

52. Ibid. p.3

In February 1947 the British informed the United States that they could no longer be responsible for the burden of protecting Greece from ongoing communist guerilla attacks or for general military and economic support of either Greece or Turkey.⁵³ At the time Greece was in serious difficulty and on the verge of economic and military collapse. It seemed evident that should Greece fall to communist subversion, the position of the free world throughout the Mediterranean, near East and Europe would be gravely threatened.

The response of U.S. policymakers to this cumulative evidence of Soviet expansionists intentions was to seize the immediate crises in Greece to launch bold new policy initiatives. The aim of these initiatives was to restore political and economic stability to they regions of the world, especially Europe which could halt the potential for Soviet domination of them. The first of these initiatives was president Harry Truman's request for \$ 400 million for a program of military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey.

On March 12, 1947, President Truman, regarding his aid request for Greece and Turkey Stated that "It must be

53. Harold. A. Hovey; "United States Military Assistance: A Study of policies and practices, praeger, New York, 1965, p.4.

the policy of United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure".⁵⁴ President Truman argued that if the United States failed to support the cause of the free peoples of the World, it would very likely endanger world peace and the welfare of the United States.

The President speech became the cornerstone. It also was the beginning of a policy of active "containment" of the Soviet Union. This policy in the broader sense, envisaged resistance to the expansion of Soviet influence and power, using whatever means were necessary whenever such an expansion threatened to undermine the independence of non communist nations of the world, either through direct aggression or internal subversion. In practice, the policy of containment led to the establishment of several U.S. security assistance programs and, ultimately, to a series of mutual defense pacts to give it force and effect as the perception of direct Soviet military threat to the West increased.

Immediately following passage of the Greek-Turkish aid program in May 1947, the Truman administration began efforts to provide massive economic assistance to much of War-torn

54. Ibid., p.5.

European countries. George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, set forth the plan during a speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. He outlined the aid program as an effort to revive global economy "so as to permit the emergence of political and Social conditions in which free institution can exist".⁵⁵

The economic impact of World War II on Europe was profound. Industrial centres had been destroyed, unemployment was high, and general living standards had been reduced notably, making Europe vulnerable to communist subversion and infiltration. U.S. policy-makers saw the rejuvenation of Europe's economy as vital to U.S. national security interest. Although the concept of direct economic assistance to foreign governments had been historically unpopular in the United States, these circumstances passed such a clear threat to U.S. Security assistance that Truman administration officials and their allies in Congress argued that a departure from previous practices was warranted.

The Truman administration soon concluded that economic assistance by itself would not be sufficient to forestall Soviet expansionsim in Europe, ●for European nations did not also have a credible military capability to resist it.

55. Hilderth, Op. cit. PP.4-5.

Thus, in March 1948, with the United States' encouragements, the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries signed a treaty of collective Security that came to known as the Brussels Pact.

A senate resolution, for the purpose of U.S. association with such regional and other collective arrangements and support in their development for "individual and collective self defense", was introduced, in the spring of 1948, by the Chairman of the Senate committee on Foreign Relations.⁵⁶

This resolution was unanimously agreed to by the committee on May 19, 1948, and passed ^{by} the Senate on June 11. The Vanderberg Resolution played a key role in developing U.S. commitment to participate in a European collective defense system and it was the basis for U.S. association with Europe in the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

An important impetus for closer association between Europe and the United States in defense was the Soviet blockade of Berlin that began in June 1948. In response to the Berlin blockade, the United States organized a massive airlift to provide necessary supplies to the citizens

56. Robert Osgood., Alliances and American Foreign Policy, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, pp.45-49.

of west Berlin.⁵⁷ The airlift was an overwhelming success, and after a year the Soviets ended the land blockade. The episode served however, to highlight continued Soviet willingness to exploit any potential European or Western Weakness and provided a powerful argument for stronger efforts in the west to contain Soviet Power.

It was in this context that the final action to break the longstanding tradition in the United States of avoiding "entangling alliances" with foreign powers - especially European - took place. On April 4 1949, the United States and eleven other European nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing NATO. The creation of NATO was a turning point in post World War II diplomatic history, demonstrating that the United States had accepted the role of an active agent for the preservation of political and military stability in the World wherever its vital national interests were placed at risk. Through the North Atlantic Treaty the United States and twelve other nations committed themselves to consider an "armed attack against one or more of them..... an attack against them all". The parties agreed that in such an event they would collectively aid the nation or nations attacked through such action as each of the parties

57. Hilderth, Op. cit., P.5.

deemed necessary,"including the use of armed forces".

The formation of NATO, in 1949, with the United States as the leading member, was considered by the U.S. policy makers, a logical extension of the effort to contain Soviet expansionism and reinforce the economic restoration of the European allies. A parallel initiative was taken by the United States to provide strength to the new collective defence system through a major programme of military assistance. This programme was created through the passage of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949, in the fall of that year.

Military assistance programme was a necessary element to give credibility to the new NATO alliance. Its intent was to add military capability where it was lacking as an adjunct to the economic assistance programme that aimed at stimulating European recovery. Its final approval by Congress was facilitated by President Truman's announcement in late September 1949 that the Soviet Union had exploded an atomic device, thus ending the American monopoly in the nuclear weapons sphere.⁵⁸

The Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 was significant for two reasons. First, it gave the United States authority to provide substantial military assistance to NATO countries as well as Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea,

58. Ibid.

and the Philippines. Second, it established the legal basis for the major security assistance program element that exist to this day. The Military Assistance Programme (MAP), which stemmed from the MDAA of 1949, provided for the loan or outright grant of military equipment materials, and services to eligible nations. In practice, nearly all MAP items were provided on a grant basis. Training was part of the basis MAP programme until 1976, when the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme was established as an independent security assistance component. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash and credit programme also had its origin in the MDAA of 1949.

The scope and nature of grant MAP, grant training and FMS cash and credit programmes changed significantly from 1949 to the present.

While the collective security system was being established in Europe, additional challenges confronted the United States in Asia. In late 1949, the fall of China to Mao Tse-tung's communist forces and the flight of Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist force to Taiwan raised concern among U.S. policy-makers about the security of other non communist states in the region. These concerns

were greatly intensified after the invasion of South Korea in June 1950 by forces from communist North Korea. In Korean war the U.S. played the major combat role, helped consolidate U.S. commitment to support programmes that fastened collective security not only in Europe but in Asia as well.

The Korean War raised concerns among U.S. policy-makers because it was a direct military challenge by communist forces to the position of the United States in Asia. Should Korea fall, Japan would be directly exposed to threats from the Soviet Union and its North Korean ally. The security of Philippines, Taiwan, and other U.S. friends and allies and South West Asia and the Pacific would also be placed in jeopardy.⁵⁹

Security assistance programmes that originated in policies designed to confront a Soviet threat in Europe had become much more global in nature after the creation of bilateral and multilateral mutual security treaties between Asian nations and the United States. These treaties included the U.S. Japanese Treaty of 1951, the U.S. Philippines Treaty of 1951, the ANZUS pact of 1951 between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and the U.S. - Republic of Korea Treaty of 1953. The establishment of these mutual

59. Hilderth, Op. cit., PP.8-9-

Security treaties with friendly states in Asia served the same U.S. foreign policy purposes in that region as NATO did in Europe.

Several other crises in Asia led the Eisenhower administration to take steps to strengthen the position of the free nations there through additional treaty commitments. The specific treaty was the South East Asia Treaty Creating SEATO, signed in September 1954, the concerns for the stability of friendly States in the South East Asian region in the wake of French War in Indo China led the United States to sponsor the South East Asia Treaty. The United States, France, Great Britain, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan and Thailand joined in this treaty which provided the basis for a U. S. security guarantee for most of South East Asia and the nearby South Pacific areas.⁶⁰

In a similar fashion, the United States responded in late 1954 to Chinese communist attack against two islands controlled by the nationalists, Quemoy and Matsu, by concluding a bilateral security treaty with Taiwan.

60. Harold A. Hevey: United States Military Assistance; A Study of Policies and Practices, Appendix 'A', Preager Publisher, 1965, pp.283-286.

The then U.S. President asked Congress for authority to use U.S. Military forces to protect Taiwan and nearby territories as he deemed necessary, which was approved by Congress. This the collective security structure that had began under President Truman with NATO had been extended to most of Asia. The programmes of security assistance to support this structure had become an integral part of American foreign policy.

After the Suez crisis of 1956 the influence of USSR in West Asia increased, Nasser was at the height of his power and he through their help wanted to remove Western influence from the region. Nasser tried to overthrow the pro-western governments in Jordan - Lebanon and Iraq. His efforts were frustrated because of timely Western help in Jordan and Lebanon but the government of Iraq was overthrown and the U.S. policymakers realized that direct intervention in the area might be required to preserve Western interests. These events led to closer U.S. association with friendly states in the region. After that the United States, through an executive agreement, formally adhered to the newly created Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), whose members included the United Kingdom, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The treaty

group announced their intent to maintain their collective security and to resist direct or indirect aggression. The United States pledged at the time to give force to its commitment by increasing military aid for Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.⁶¹ It also recommitted itself to provide security assistance to nations that had been viewed since the beginning of the MAP programme as key bulwarks against the spread of communist influence in the strategic Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Sout West Asian Area.⁶²

United state's efforts towards decreasing USSR influence and increasing its own in the region continued. And its economic and Military assistance to the countries of the region, particularly Iran, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, ~~Turkey~~, ~~is~~ continued. All this resulted into the induction of Egypt into the U.S. camp which was supported to be a close Russian ally. The camp David accord of 1978 resulted into the isolation of Egypt in the region and its allingment with U.S. was increased. In 1979 Iran, after the revolution, became the enemy of U.S. which before the revolution was a closet ally. This was a clear set back to the U.S. interest in the region. Since then to balance the loss united states started assisting Pakistan, with much vigour, both economically and Militarily.

61. Richard F. Grimmett. The Role of Security Assistance in Historical Perspective , in U.S. security Assistance: The Political process, edited by Ernest Graves, STEvena. Hildreth, Lexington Book, 1985,

Pakistan, today, is said the closet ally of America through which US is trying to obtain and satisfy its global interest particularly in South and West Asia.

To sustain and maintain its interest, the military assistance supplied by U.S. to its different allies are as follows:-

Leading Program Participants

(Thousands of Current U.S. Dollers)

MAP PROGRAM@

FMS (Sales) PROGRAM AGREEMENTS

FISCAL YEARS 1964-1973

Turkey	1,674,853	West Germany	3,382,743
Greece	720,491	United Kingdom	1,665,475
Spain	196,727	Italy	488,197
Norway	123,006	Canada	438,651
		Australia	922,650
		Japan	283,143
		New Zealand	105,602
		Israel	1,525,235
		South Africa	2,223

 FISCAL YEARS 1974-1982

Portugal	347,137	United Kingdom	5,251,219
Turkey	211,832	Netherlands	3,266,439
Greece	147,621	West Germany	3,094,318
Spain	112,052	Belgium	1,948,830
Israel	5,500,000	Australia	5,093,758
Egypt	204,540	Japan	2,476,777
		Israel	8,240,243
		Egypt	5,369,169

@ MAP Program includes: MPA Program. MAP Excess, IMET.

— Data on Defense Department Budget authority taken from National Defense Budget Estimates for FY- 1982, Office of comptroller, March 1981, P.5 and Ibid, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1983 March 1982, P.4, MAP Program appropriation data taken from congressional Presentation Document, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1983, DOD, P.11.

Initially the U.S. Security assistance programme was mostly directed towards Europe. Because, Europe was at the top of U.S. foreign policy priorities: And so, other areas were low down in the list of beneficiaries of MAP Program.

As far as U.S. allies are concerned, Turkey Greece Spain and Israel were the main MAP recipients. While Australia, United Kingdom, Japan, New Zealand, Israel and West Germany were the main FMS Programme purchasers.

These countries were very important in relation with U.S. global strategy, and they were the main partners in the U.S. Security treaties. As the European countries slowly and gradually became economically self-sufficient major arms sales were done through FMS sales.

Important allies of U.S. received weapons which were more than U.S. military needs, the primary considerations of which countries should get what types of areas were the recipients level of military sophistication and absorption capacity and its immediate defense needs.

By 1963, a shift was visible from the MAP Programme to the FMS program in U.S. security assistance policy. The Marshall plan had helped America's European allies in rebuilding their economies. These countries were now

ranked second behind United Kingdom and West Germany.

Starting with the FY 1974 aid bill a large amount of Israel's FMS credit purchases were waived. Since then \$5.5 billion have been waived. Egypt was also given \$ 200 million in this type of waiver.⁶⁴

From 1976, Israel was also given the privilege to service its FMS debts through a system of concessional financing. Later on this concessional formula was also extended to other friendly countries like Turkey, Greece and Egypt. Such steps were initiated to help nations which were considered vital for U.S. security interests and were short of necessary funds to pay for the required weaponry.

In the early 1950s during the start period of NATO and the process of rearming Europe, the grant program was at its height. After this period it came down slowly. Later an increase was seen in the early 1980s. Today the grant programme is substantially smaller than that of the early 1950s.

The FMS credit program has also followed the various ups and down in U.S. policy. It was small until the FY 1970.

64. Graves, Ernest, and Hildreth, Steven A. U.S. Security Assistance: The political process. Lexington. Books 1985, p.23.

better equipped to pay for the required weapon, and the U.S. policy makers also requested them to do so, Such a trend of a distinct shift towards the FMS Program became more prominent in the early 1970s.

As far as Spain and Portugal are concerned assistance to these countries, "was not cut off when other European nations stopped receiving new commitments for aid in the early 1960s, partly because these countries were less capable of paying the full costs of adequate defense".⁶³

In 1959 President Nixon announced the "Nixon Doctrine", under which the "U.S. use its security assistance resources to bolster the military power of key regional states to the extent these states were willing and able to preserve regional peace without direct U.S. military involvement" The increased American commitment from then onwards was clearly guided by this policy.

Between the period 1973-82, The Europe and Canada ranked third in MAP Program and training funding behind some South-East Asian countries. The Principal recipients were Turkey and portugal which provided the U.S. with important military bases. In FMS purchases this region

63. Harold A. Hovey, op.cit. p.84.

But after the FY 1979, it showed a sharp increase because of the large amounts given for Israel and Egypt which were the major U.S. allies in West Asia.

Hence, the Security assistance program could be seen "as a viable means to help others help the United States to support the ultimate objective of preserving world peace, as well as a less costly alternative to direct military involvement both financially and politically".⁶⁵

65. Ibid. p.39.

CONCLUSION

Before World War II the U.S. ranked third in arms exports behind France and Great Britain. But after the War arms transfers became a major tool of U.S. foreign policy. The first step in this direction was the revision of the Neutrality Act in 1939 and later the lend-lease programme of 1941. During the World War I, the U.S. had been a major arms supplier, but in the inter-war years the process slowed down. But it again picked momentum after the Second World War, with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947.

Mainly weapons were exported to the European allies under the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) which was free of charge. In the 1950s and early 1960s with the expansion of the policy of containment the military assistance also expanded to other geographical regions.

In the 1960s a change was made in the form of U.S. arms exports. The U.S. security assistance changed from MAP grants to arms sales under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.

The use of grant military aid continued to decline in the 1970s, and commercial sales increased during that time.

With the passage of the Nelson Amendment in 1974 Congress secured Veto power over major arms sales. Though it had been exercising authority over government aid but until then it had none over government approved sales.

The International Security Assistance and Arms Exports control Act were designed to control the sales of arms and it included specific congressional guideline for U.S. arms sales policy. In addition, it took many steps to control arms traffic.

Since World War II, the U.S. foreign policy-makers have used arms transfers as an important instrument of their foreign policy. These arms exports have been traditionally done in the form of grant aid and weapons sales for credit or cash. Till the mid 1960s arms transfers were a controversial component of U.S. national security policy. It was generally accepted that weapons exports not only were helpful to recipient countries but contributed to U.S. security as well. Providing weapons to allies and friends was justified by the perceived Soviet threat and constituted a key element of U.S. containment policy.

In the late 1960s increasing reliance on weapons exports by successive administrations began to cause concern among members of Congress and segments of U.S. public. Initially arms transfers were mainly directed

towards European allies and other close friends of the U.S., but more transfers in the 1970s were made to the Third World through government to government sales. By mid 1970s Congress had started exercising increasing control over U.S. arms transfers. The policy under President Carter was to limit unilaterally, U.S. arms sales to the Third World and to negotiate multilateral restraints with other major arms supplies. It tried to discourage regional arms competition based on the acquisition of higher level of weapons technology. In addition , it said that the U.S. would not permit co-production agreements for significant weapons, equipment and major components with Third World countries.

The Reagan administration, however, adopted a different course. It emphasized on the global threat posed by the Soviet Union; a threat that required the U.S. to supply arms to its friends and allies to ensure mutual security.

The goals of Reagan administrations policy was to demonstrate the enduring interest that the U.S. has in its allies and friends and that it would not allow them to be at a disadvantage. It endeavoured to strengthen the mutual security relationships of the U.S. and to help deter aggression by enhancing preparedness of friends and allies.

The main aim of U.S. arms transfer policy in the Third World is to maintain regional stability. The Middle East is the major arms importer in the Third World. Between 1976 and 1980, 46% of major weapons sent to the Third World went to this area. In addition to arms, U.S. sales to these areas include military construction equipment, services etc. U.S. arm sales in this region has been guided by certain factors which are, security of Israel, prevention of Arab-Israel armed conflict, to availability of oil and limiting of Soviet influence there.

U.S. arms aid and supplies to other Third World countries like those in South and South East Asia has been guided by the United States global strategy. The creation of CENTO and SEATO military alliances was concluded to counter Soviet influence in these areas and to save them from communism.

As regards Latin America, prior to the 1960's the U.S. dominated the Arms sales market, there, but now the diversity of suppliers is greater there. There it has been the development of influence and good relations with the countries rather than security concerns that have been the traditional justification for U.S. arms transfers. President Carder brought the human rights issue to the fore here as elsewhere. But the Reagan administration's primary concern

was hemispheric security and the competition for influence with the USSR rather than human rights.

Security assistance program have also been used to help friendly and allied nations acquire and maintain the capability to defend themselves, serving both specific U.S. national interest and collective security of the "free world".

The concept of collective security in the post second World War period was based on the idea that preemptive alliances could deter conflict. The Brussels pact of 1948 was conducted keeping in view this idea.

In this period the policy of containment of communism led to the establishment of several U.S. security assistance programs, and ultimately to a series of mutual defense pacts to give it force and effect as the perception of direct Soviet military threat to the West increased.

The Berlin Blockade done by the USSR in June 1948, served to highlight continued Soviet Willingness to exploit any potential European or Western Weakness and provided a powerful argument for stronger efforts in the West to contain Soviet power. It was in this context that the final action to break the longstanding tradition in the U.S. of avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers

took place. On April 4, 1949, the U.S. and eleven others European nations signed the North Atlantic treaty, forming the NATO. The creation of NATO was a turning point in world diplomatic history, demonstrating that the U.S. had accepted the role of an active agent for the preservation of political and military stability in the World, wherever its vital national interest were at stake.

A parallel initiative was taken by the U.S. to provide strength to the new collective defense system through a major program of military assistance. This program was created through the passage of a Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.

Several bilateral and multilateral mutual security treaties between the U.S. and Asian nations served the same U.S. foreign policy purpose in the concerned regions as NATO did in Europe. These treaties included the US-Japanese treaty of 1951, the U.S.- Philippines treaty of 1951, the ANZUS pact of 1951, and the U.S.-Republic of Korea Treaty of 1953.

Later, the creation of SEATO in 1954, provided the basis for a U.S. security guarantee for most of South - East Asia and the nearby South Pacific areas. The CENTO

served as a key bulwark against the spread of Communist influence in the strategic Middle-East , Persian Gulf and South West Asian areas.

Thus the collective security structure that had begun in 1947 had been extended to most of Asia. The program of Security Assistance to support this structure had become an integral part of American Foreign policy.

In the end, it can be said that the U.S. global interests have throughout been the motivating factor for arms sales to its close allies and other Third World countries. After the World War II containment of communism was the most important factor in U.S. strategy, and so arms aid was mainly given to countries under the perceived threat of the USSR. With America's new found role of a Super Power in World affairs it was necessary for it to ensure the security and existence of its allies and to see that other Third world countries do not come under the Soviet influence. Hence, all forms of arms exports both as grant aid and weapons sales for credit or cash have throughout been an important factor in U.S. global strategy.

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